

~~020068~~
033004

JPRS-UIA-86-047

23 OCTOBER 1986

20000104 143

USSR Report

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

No 3, MAY-JUNE 1986

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

23 OCTOBER 1986

USSR REPORT
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

No 3, May-June 1986

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, published in Moscow by the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

English Summary of Major Articles (pp 219-221).....	1
Author Information (p 218).....	7
Capitalist, Noncapitalist Paths of Development Contrasted (pp 3-16) (P.V. Volobuyev).....	9
Structural Policy of the Developing Countries and the World Capitalist Economy (pp 17-27) (E.Ye. Obminskiy) (not translated)	
USSR-Nonaligned Movement's Principles Shown to Coincide (pp 28-36) (R.A. Tuzmukhamedov).....	25
China's Foreign Trade Reorientation--Problems, Prospects (pp 37-46) (S.S. Tsyplakov).....	36
Ulyanovskiy on Past, Present of Indian Communist Party (pp 47-53) (R.A. Ulyanovskiy).....	51
Japan's Intellectual Traditions and Existentialism (pp 54-62) (A.L. Lutskiy) (not translated)	

Sources of the Arab National-Liberation Movement in
Palestine (pp 63-71)
(I.D. Zvyagelskaya, V.I. Nosenko) (not translated)

From the History of Oriental and African Studies

Konstantin Andreyevich Kharnskiy (pp 82-86)
(G.I. Podpalova) (not translated)

REPORTS

France's Military Relations with African States Criticized (pp 87-93)
(E.G. Georgiyev)..... 61

Afghan Historian on British Policy in Afghanistan in First Third
of 20th Century (pp 94-99)
(M. Davlyatov) (not translated)

Late Medieval Muslim Historiography (pp 100-108)
(T.I. Sultanov) (not translated)

SCIENTIFIC LIFE

Collection of Oriental MSS of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences
Oriental Studies Institute (pp 109-112)
(M.G. Pikulin, K.M. Munirov, Tashkent) (not translated)

Department of History of Asian and African Countries of the
Azerbaijan State University (pp 113-114)
(Z.Z. Abdullayev, Baku) (not translated)

Tibetan Literary Sources from an Expedition to Western Nepal in
the Katmandu National Archives (pp 115-116)
(N.D. Bolsokhoyeva, Ulan-Ude) (not translated)

'Social Movements and Their Ideology in Precapitalist Asian
Societies'(pp 117-121)
(K.Z. Ashrafyan) (not translated)

News Notes

Orientalist Association's Conference on Modern Role of Asian
Traditions (pp 122-123)..... 70

Conferences at Oriental Studies Institute Described (pp 123-126)..... 73

Africa Institute 'Roundtable' on Continent's Food Problems
(pp 126-128)..... 77

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Publications

Books and People (From the Life of an Asian Museum) (pp 133-146)
(M.V. Bankovskaya, Leningrad) (not translated)

Surveys

Problems of the Perception of European Culture by Japan and China
in the Context of the Development of Neo-Confucian Philosophy
(pp 147-157)

(A.V. Zagorskiy) (not translated)

'East-West' as a Problem of the History of Culture (pp 158-169)
(Ye.B. Rashkovskiy) (not translated)

Reviews

A.L. Kondakov Review of 'Oil Monarchies of Arabia. Development
Problems' by A.G. Georgiyev and V.V. Ozoling (pp 170-174)..... 81

N.A. Simoniya Review of L.N. Borokh's 'China's Social Thought and
Socialism (Start of 20th Century)' (pp 174-176)..... 87

R.R. Vyatkina, M.F. Yuryev Review of I.I. Filatova's 'Recent and
Contemporary History of Kenya' (pp 176-179) (not translated)

V.B. Ramzes Review of Tadao Morimoto's 'Diabolical History'
(in Japanese) (pp 179-183) (not translated)

I.I. Peyros Review of 'The Origins of Chinese Civilization'. Edited
by D.N. Keightley (pp 183-190) (not translated)

Ye.M. Medvedev (Deceased) Review of 'The Image of India. The Study
of Ancient Indian Civilization in the USSR' by G. Bongard-Levin and
A. Vigasin (pp 190-193) (not translated)

Book Notes

Yu.N. Gavrilov Notes on 'The East: Ideas and Ideology. Critique of
Bourgeois and Petty Bourgeois "Third Way" Development Concepts' by
L.P. Polonskaya and A.Kh. Vafa (pp 194-196)..... 91

Ye.S. Safronova Notes on 'Philosophical Questions of Buddhism'
(pp 197-198) (not translated)

Ye.I. Mashtakova, V.I. Sheremet (Leningrad) Notes on Ye.A. Petrosyan's
'Turkish Advocacy Writing of the Era of Reforms in the Ottoman Empire
(End of 18th-Start of 20th Centuries)' (pp 198-201) (not translated)

V.N. Kislyakov (Leningrad) Notes on I.V. Megrelidze's 'Iosif Orbeli' (pp 201-203) (not translated)

List of Main Scientific Works of Prof L.D. Yablochkov, doctor of historical sciences (On His 60th Birthday) (p 203) (not translated)

List of Main Scientific Works of Doctor of Historical Sciences M.G. Pikulin (On His 80th Birthday) (p 204) (not translated)

COMMENT, RESPONSE, POLEMIC

Concerning (Kalam) as the 'Orthodox Philosophy' of Islam (pp 205-212) (T.K. Ibragim) (not translated)

M.N. Pak, L.R. Kontsevich, Ye.A. Davidovich Obituary of Innokentiy Ivanovich Khvan Donmin (p 213) (not translated)

Obituary of Berta Isaakovna Sharevskaya (p 214) (not translated)

Obituary of Kanat Kalashevich Kurdoyev (pp 215-216) (not translated)

Obituary of Igor Fedorovich Zhulev (p 217) (not translated)

ENGLISH SUMMARY OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 86 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 219-221

[Text] ON CHOICE OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS BY AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES

P.V. Volobuyev

The article deals with the choice of a pattern of social development by Third World countries. The choice of a pattern of development implies both a choice of a fundamentally new direction, or a type of social evolution, and a choice of quantitatively different directions which have been already established.

The article distinguishes two stages in the struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa for new progressive patterns of social and political development. The first one falls on the 1950s and the first half of the 1970s. Following the defeat of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan and the collapse of the colonial system the developing world had the alternative of either a socialist or a capitalist development. Some countries have embarked on the road to socialism, a considerable number of states proclaimed the socialist orientation their strategy, in actual fact a non-capitalist way of a gradual transition to socialism. Most of the countries have chosen a capitalist way of development. It was the latter choice that has fully revealed that the option for the capitalist road of development, historically, had been a belated decision. It has also demonstrated that capitalism is not able to cope with the task of overcoming backwardness and do away with the neo-colonial exploitation and poverty of the bulk of population.

The article analyzes also the second stage of the revolutionary and democratic forces struggle for the choice of progressive patterns of development leading to socialism from the second half of the 1970s onward. Its distinctive feature has been a growing social tension and class struggle in the countries of capitalist orientation. It is demonstrated that the social development of the past two to three decades has added new aspects to the problem of choosing progressive patterns of development by Afro-Asian countries. On the other hand, the old factors are still there. They allow for a by-passing or interrupting the capitalist development by taking a non-capitalist way of development. On the other hand, the capitalist

development brings about new opportunities of a revolutionary choice of a road to socialism on the basis of capitalism, crisis of capitalist and pre-capitalist structures and aggravation of all social contradictions.

STRUCTURE POLICY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WORLD CAPITALIST ECONOMY

E.Ye. Obminsky

The developing countries participating in the international capitalist division of labor confront a number of problems of structural nature. Their essence lies in the contradiction between the accelerated integration of developing nations into the world economy and their lack of established national reproduction complexes attuned to up-to-date standards. Hence, the developing countries have been attaching an ever growing importance to the optimization of the national economic structure with regard to the international economic ties.

The first half of the 1980s saw a growing vulnerability of the liberated countries facing the aggravating problems of the world capitalist economy. These countries were forced to review their economic priorities by and large and abandon some long-term strategies to gain immediate results on resolving profound crises. The article demonstrates the distinction in the approach of developing nations to the solution of structural problems depending on the level of the forces of production, their relation to the world market and their socio-economic strategy.

The article pays special attention to the way the state exerts influence on the structural changes both by direct participation in the economic activity and by means of indirect regulation. It notes that in the present-day context the fact that some goods can compete at the world market is by no means a guaranty of a successful economic development. The enhanced protectionism pursued by developed capitalist states jeopardizes the development of export industries in developing countries and, consequently, the national economic structure, as a whole.

The deterioration of the financial and economic conditions in the developing world is coupled with their being pressurized by the financial bodies controlled by the West and by the international monopoly capital. The implementation of measures insisted upon by the USA and other Western states would have exacerbated the vulnerability of the economic structure of the developing nations and undermined their economic security in relation to new upheavals of the world economy.

It is emphasized that an independent economic policy of the developing nations is largely opposed by the global schemes of TNCs which are trying to "integrate" entire countries into their model of the world structure of production. It is in this context that the establishment of equal international relations, free of discrimination within the framework of international economic community, is becoming a top priority. This approach alone will provide conditions essential for the optimization of the economic structure of the developing countries.

TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

R.A. Tuzmukhamedov

During the twenty five years elapsing since its inception the non-aligned movement manifested itself as an integral part and an important factor in the struggle against the policy of imperialism and all manifestations of inequality in interstate relations, as a factor in the struggle for peace and international security. This movement is in the main on the side of the major driving forces of the movement, peoples of liberated countries, massive democratic movements.

The article characterizes the essence of the idea and practice of the non-alignment, its contribution to the anti-colonial struggle, to the consolidation of political and economic independence of liberated states, and disarmament. It also notes their enhancing role in international affairs, their growing concern over the crucial issues confronting mankind.

The Soviet Union and other socialist states have been always supporting the lofty objectives of the non-aligned movement and greatly appreciate its contribution to the struggle for peace and security.

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN TRADE OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

S.S. Tsiplakov

Over the past few years the People's Republic of China has been taking steps to boost the national economic development in a big way. The article grapples with the Chinese approach to the promotion of foreign trade. The latter is largely subordinated to the modernization of the national economy. In the late 1970s China abandoned the concept of autarchic economic structure and adopted a policy open to outside world. This program implies an integration into the international economic division of labor. This policy called in China "strategic" and "invariable" substantially increased the volume of foreign trade and transformed trade into one of the most dynamic sectors. Along with this there are some problems which remain to be unresolved. They deal with such fields as administration, a balanced foreign trade, export and import structures in terms of goods.

Although the leading trading partners of China are in the main developed capitalist countries, recently there has emerged a pronounced trend of the expansion of trade and economic ties with the USSR and other socialist countries. The Chinese-Soviet trade cooperation is an important reservoir of sound and stable development of the Chinese foreign trade.

The article suggests that the review of the development priorities in favor of the enhanced foreign trade does not imply that the Chinese policy in this regard has been formulated once and for all. Changes in the international arena, shifts in the trends of world trade and objective conditions of economic development might give an impetus to a substantial change of the current policy.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA, A PARTY OF PATRIOTS AND INTERNATIONALISTS

R.A. Ulyanovsky

The coming into existence of the Communist Party of India was of historic importance as regards both the liberation struggle of the Indian people and the international working class and communist movement. The fact that a Marxist-Leninist party was formed in an Asian country with a predominant peasant population, where class relations were entangled in the meshes of caste, communal, religious and tribal ties, substantiates the general character and enormous mobilizing force of the ideas of scientific communism.

The article characterizes the experience of Indian communists in the struggle for social and national liberation, their strategy and tactics, the combination of class and national goals of their struggle, the attitude of the CPI towards other Indian parties and organizations and, in the first place, to the Indian National Congress. It also examines the main stages of the CPI's history, its slogans and the directions of its current struggle both at home and abroad.

JAPANESE SPIRITUAL TRADITION AND EXISTENTIALISM

A.L. Lutsky

The article is an attempt to elucidate from the Marxist point of view the processes taking place in the social consciousness of Japan that contributed to the spreading of existentialist ideas. It examines the role of Japanese spiritual tradition developing under the constant influence of ethnic and religious teachings, primarily Buddhism. It deals with two main tendencies of Buddhism representing two possibilities of self-exposure of the individual.

The article maintains that the Japanese cultural tradition possesses a clearly marked non-individualistic, non-personal tint, that distinguishes it from the Western one, where existential philosophy arose.

The comparative analysis of the Buddhist and existentialistic Weltanschauung suggests their definite proximity, that was, according to the author's opinion, one of the main reasons for the spreading of existential views in Japan. Another important reason was the predominance of capitalism that contributed to the same processes which gave birth to the existentialistic trends in the West.

The transitional period from feudalism to capitalism in Japan was extremely short. That is why the Japanese individualism is relatively younger than the Western one, deeply rooted in the tradition, which came into existence during the Renaissance.

For centuries the individual in Japan existed as a representative of a definite social group that was regarded as his own essence. For a long time the Japanese was "nothing," if he or she had not been integrated into the social context. If the essence of the "miserable consciousness" of Western existentialists was a tragic feeling of alienation towards other people, in Japan the characteristic feature of the existentialists of Buddhist orientation at first was the feeling of absence of a strong "ego".

The article exemplifies the considerable difference between Western and Japanese existentialistic outlook by a comparative analysis of novels by the existentialistically-oriented writers of Japan and the West, namely, Abe Kobo and Albert Camus.

ORIGINS OF ARAB NATIONAL-LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN PALESTINE

I.D. Zvyagelskaya, V.I. Nosenko

The article deals with the genesis of the liberation struggle of the Arab people of Palestine which came into existence in the early 20th century. It examines the Zionist colonization of Palestine and the policy used by Zionists to oust the local Arab population. It pays special attention to the British colonial policy which tried to secure imperial interests at the expense of the indigenous population. The Palestinian Arabs had to combat both the British colonialism and Zionist infiltration. It was this struggle, first and foremost, that stimulated the formation of the Palestinian national identity.

The article gives preference to the 1920s and 1930s, for these were the years of the evolution of the platform of the movement, its political orientation and class essence. The analysis of the movement allows to ascertain the reasons of the influence exerted upon the movement by the feudal elite and those of its radicalization and growth of anti-colonial sentiments in the 1930s.

Structurally, the movement has also progressed having come a long way from casual actions to the national uprising of 1936-39. The uprising and the adverse effect of its failure on the movement are also discussed.

Despite the fact that during the period under discussion the people of Palestine were fighting against heavy odds, the experience gained in the course of the anti-colonial struggle helped the people of Palestine to overcome the defeat of the movement and carry on the struggle headed today by the Palestine Liberation Organization, the only legitimate representative of the people of Palestine.

FORMATION OF RELATIONS OF DEPENDENCY AND EXPLOITATION IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA

L.Ye. Kubbel

The article deals with the problem of the origins of dependency and exploitation relations in the light of F. Engels' thesis on two possible ways of class formation. Dependency and exploitation in pre-capitalist societies are considered as dialectically linked and interdependent parts of a specialized relational complex. The role of endogenous and exogenous factors in the arising of it is analyzed, as well as the connection of the evolution of the above process and of its local forms with various ways of politogenesis, i.e. state formation. Finally, the article examines some regional variants of the formation of the dependency-exploitation relational complex in Tropical Africa.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1986

CSO: 1812/160-E

AUTHOR INFORMATION

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 86 (signed to press 27 May 86) p 218

[Text] Pavel Vasilyevich Volobuyev, doctor of historical sciences, professor, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences History of Natural Science and Technology Institute.

Ernest Yevgenyevich Obminskiy, doctor of economic sciences, professor, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute.

Rais Abdulkhakovich Tuzmukhamedov, doctor of historical sciences, professor, associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law.

Sergey Sergeyevich Tsyplakov, graduate student of the Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov Asian and African Countries Institute.

Rostislav Aleksandrovich Ulyanovskiy, doctor of economic sciences, professor, member of the NARODY AZII I AFRIKI Editorial Board.

Aleksandr Leonidovich Lutskiy, graduate student of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute.

Irina Donovna Zvyagelskaya, candidate of historical sciences, associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute.

Vladimir Ivanovich Nosenko, candidate of historical sciences, head of a department of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute.

Lev Yevgenyevich Kubbel, doctor of historical sciences, associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ethnography Institute, deputy chief editor of SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA.

Galina Ivanovna Podpalova, doctor of historical sciences, assistant professor, associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute.

Mullosho Davlyatov, candidate of historical sciences, lecturer at the Tajik State University imeni V.I. Lenin.

Tursun Ikramovich Sultanov, candidate of historical sciences, associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute Leningrad Department.

Marianna Vasilyevna Bankovskaya, daughter of Academician V.M. Alekseyev, compiler of a number of posthumous publications of his works.

Aleksey Vladimirovich Zagorskiy, junior scientific associate of the USSR Foreign Ministry Moscow State International Relations Institute.

Yevgeniy Borisovich Rashkovskiy, candidate of historical sciences, associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute.

Taufik Kamel Ibragim, doctor of philosophical sciences, associate of the "Progress" Publishing House.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1986

8850

CSO: 1807/385

CAPITALIST, NONCAPITALIST PATHS OF DEVELOPMENT CONTRASTED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 3-16

[Article by P.V. Volobuyev: "Concerning the Question of Asian and African Developing Countries' Choice of Social Development Paths"]

[Excerpts] The 27th CPSU Congress paid great attention to an analysis of the socioeconomic and political development of the emergent countries, the place and significance of their anti-imperialist struggle in the world revolutionary process and their peoples' choice of new progressive paths of social development.

Following the collapse of imperialism's colonial system the emergent countries found themselves at the historical crossroads. While tackling the main task of national liberation the movements which had unfolded in them at the same time contained a tendency to go beyond this general democratic framework. They were afforded an opportunity of embarking on the accomplishment of a task of a higher order--social liberation--having opted for a new progressive path of development leading to socialism.

As is known, the majority of emergent countries was unsuccessful at that time in realizing this opportunity to switch to a new type of sociopolitical development. It would seem expedient from the standpoints of the present day to return to an elucidation of at least certain reasons for this outcome. It is even more important to investigate the current stage of the struggle of peoples of the developing countries for the choice of new, progressive paths and also to attempt to evaluate its prospects. It is essential, however, to approach this problem not as a local problem concerning only the countries of the Third World but as a global and general historical problem inasmuch as the main social alternative of our era--socialism or capitalism--confronts this degree of seriousness or the other all nonsocialist countries.

As far as the "choice of path" category is concerned, we should refer, it seems to us, to a fundamentally new direction or type of social evolution and also qualitatively different paths in the direction which has already been determined.

With reference to the capitalistically undeveloped developing countries of Asia and Africa (and partially of Latin America also) the alternative of our time--socialism or capitalism--and there is no other, "works" somewhat differently than in the developed and mid-development capitalist countries. This is explained primarily by the different historical situation--the existence of a world socialist system actually embodying the historical necessity of our era and the movement of capitalism as a formation in line of descent. The objective conditions here are appreciably different from those in the capitalist countries of the first and second "echelons": a different level and type of development of capitalist relations, different proportion and significance of other modes of production, different socio-class structure of the population and different degree of influence of external factors of development. The zero or low level of development of capitalism and its weakness attesting its belatedness and limited domestic potential afford many countries a favorable opportunity for bypassing or sharply abridging the capitalist phase of development, interrupting it and embarking on the path leading to socialism. The historical hopelessness of capitalism is seen not in the fact that on a capitalist path these countries are fatally condemned to remain virtually forever in the grip of underdevelopment but in the fact that there exists in the world another, more progressive--socialist--path of social development.

To judge by everything, the peoples of the developing countries have in recent years embarked on a new stage of struggle for choice of development path leading ultimately to socialism. The first stage (1950's--first half of the 1970's), when it seemed to the leaders of many liberation movements that the peoples of the emergent countries could under the conditions of the collapse of imperialism's colonial system and on the basis of the political independence which had been achieved easily channel their social development in any direction they wished, is over. These were exaggerated expectations. The political leadership of many young Asian and African states naturally addressed their thoughts to socialism. The capitalist development path was identified by the people's masses with the recent colonialism and was rejected by them. The authority of the Soviet Union had grown immeasurably, and the figures of Afro-Asian countries who in reality had not even thought about socialism could not fail to reckon with the magnetic force of socialism. In the mid-1960's some 43 parties proclaimed as their program goal a transition to socialism in Africa alone.* And although, as subsequent experience showed, far from all of them intended or were capable of leading their peoples along the path toward socialism, this trend has to be considered.

Particular store was set by the commune as the predominant form of social organization of the peasantry and the main foothold of the transformation of the undeveloped economy in a socialist direction. Thus there was a revival

* M.N. Avsenev, "Choice of Development Path and Present-Day Anticommunism," Moscow, 1984, p 22.

in a different era, as it were, of the old populist utopias concerning the possibility of a transition to socialism via the commune (within the framework of the "African socialism" concept and so forth). In addition, actual attempts were made even on the basis of the spontaneous development of the commune to switch by the evolutionary path, so to speak, directly to socialism. Communal projects had been adopted for this purpose by the start of the 1960's in 32 Asian and North African countries.* But it did not take long for practice to show the groundlessness of these projects. Such an outcome was no surprise to Marxists: substitution for truly radical social transformations implemented in the interests of the masses of the preservation and development of communal primitive production could not have produced any other results.**

The collapse of the communal projects was brought about not only by their utopianism and the erroneousness of the ideas concerning the facility of the path toward socialism of backward countries (of which, as is known, the Russian populists were guilty also) but also by the nature and forms of the transition of the majority of developing countries to national independence. Let us recall how the colonial system of imperialism fell apart. The smashing, given the decisive role of the Soviet Union, of the main bastions of imperialist reaction in Europe and Asia, formation of the world socialist system and the weakening of the main colonial powers--Britain and France--changed the correlation of world forces. The 1949 victory of the Chinese people's revolution was a powerful blow to the system of colonial domination. Revolutions in Vietnam, Indonesia, Egypt and Algeria and the powerful upsurge of national liberation movements in India, Burma, Malaya, on the Philippines and in other Afro-Asian countries shook the very foundations of colonial domination. But imperialism did not give up its positions without a fight. The peoples of Vietnam, Indonesia and Algeria won national independence by the revolutionary armed path. These revolutions forced the imperialists of Britain and France in the 1940's-1960's to "voluntarily" consent to the granting of independence to the majority of their other former colonies. As a result a large proportion of Asian and African countries gained independence by the reformist path. This was essentially a class compromise between the former metropolises and the ruling circles of the emergent countries.

As we can see the peaceful gaining of national independence by many peoples derived from the outcome of WWII and the victorious national liberation and popular-democratic revolutions on imperialism's colonial periphery. But, on leaving the colonies the imperialists concerned themselves with the main thing--keeping the liberated (by both the reformist and revolutionary paths) countries in the orbit of the world capitalist economy and development.

* See L.V. Danilova, V.P. Danilov, "Problems of the Theory and History of the Commune. The Commune in Africa. Problems of Typology," Moscow, 1978, p. 56.

** Ibid.

Therefore when it is said that in the 1950's-1960's many emergent countries opted for the capitalist development path, this generally true assertion corresponding to the nature of their present social evolution is in need of specification. Probably only of a few countries of this group could it be said that they (in the person of their ruling elites) made a capitalist choice consciously. On the majority of peoples of Afro-Asian countries, on the other hand, it was imposed by the former imperialist metropolises or neocolonialist regimes. As a result they either continued the movement along a capitalist path which had started even earlier or embarked on this path for the first time. The weakness of the progressive, revolutionary and democratic forces--the eventual exponents of socialist ideas--and the spread in the ranks of national and revolutionary democracy of the ideology of non-Marxist socialism were a principal internal subjective reason for such a turn of events. Only some Asian countries (North Korea, China and Vietnam and, later, Laos and Cambodia) embarked following the victory of the people's revolutions on a socialist development path. Approximately 15 countries (their composition is changing constantly) have proclaimed a socialist orientation as the alternative to neocolonialism and capitalism.*

Such are the results of the first stage of the struggle of peoples of the developing countries for choice of path of further development, which had ended by the end of the 1970's. It may now be said in general form, Soviet and foreign Marxist scholars believe, that three directions of movement have been defined in the developing world: socialist, socialist orientation and capitalist.**

The new stage of the struggle for choice of development path, which began in the latter half of the 1970's, is characterized by two basic features. The first is that "the struggle for national liberation in many countries has begun in practice to develop into a struggle against exploiter relations, both feudal and capitalist."*** The second feature, which ensues from the first, is that the choice of a new, progressive path leading to socialism in the developing countries of a capitalist orientation could be merely the result of a clash of class forces advocating this development path or the other and the victory of progressive, revolutionary forces. Or, as Ye.M. Primakov justly writes, "a change in the situation in this country or the

* See "The Foreign East and the Present Day," vol 1, Moscow, 1980, p 425.

** Ye.M. Primakov, "The East Following the Collapse of the Colonial System," Moscow, 1982, pp 5, 29, 54-55; S. Mirtha, G. Mirskiy, E. Pakhad, "The State and the Problem of Choice of Path in the Developing Countries," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 3, 1982, p 55. True, some scholars believe that there are states which have not yet determined their development path, although there are increasingly few of them left on the map of the developing world (see G.F. Kim, "From National to Social Liberation," Moscow, 1982, p 132).

*** "Material of the 26th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1981, p 12.

other now could occur merely as a result of a revolutionary or counterrevolutionary shift, which would interrupt its movement along the chosen path."* In other words, countries of a capitalist orientation are increasingly falling under the influence of the law of history according to which the choice of both immediate (direct) and transitional paths to socialism is impossible outside of class struggle and social revolution in the soil of capitalism.

Why has the problem of choice of path of further development confronted, with great seriousness, furthermore, the people of the developing countries proceeding along a capitalist path? It cannot be said that it has been conclusively solved in the sense of predetermination of the victory of socialism in the countries of a socialist orientation even.**

This exacerbation of the struggle in connection with choice of path was born of the interaction of factors of an external and internal order. First, there has been an indisputable strengthening of Third World countries' incorporation in world social development, in the turbulent maelstrom of the ideological, political and class struggle occurring on the world scene. Whence also the great susceptibility of these countries to all the winds and currents of our era. Reference should be made primarily here to the increased revolutionizing influence of the world socialist system and also the direct material, technical and moral-political support it is rendering the peoples which have embarked on a progressive development path.

At the same time there has also been a strengthening of the influence of imperialism on the developing countries and its endeavor to keep them within the system of the world capitalist economy and implant and strengthen bourgeois practices in them. For this purpose imperialism, American particularly, has begun to resort more openly, impudently and extensively to power methods, as far as the use of military force (Libya) and intervention (Grenada). Simultaneously the utmost use is being made of means of economic pressure, particularly in respect of countries which have found themselves in a difficult position, via the international banks included.

The developing countries today are a battlefield between the two social systems. Their struggle "is speeding up the process of the socioeconomic stratification of the bulk of developing countries."***

* Ye.M. Primakov, Op. cit., p 55.

** See G.B. Starushenko, "The Socialist Orientation in the Developing Countries," Moscow, 1978, p 52.

*** "The Developing Countries in the Modern World. New Power in World Politics," Moscow, 1984, p 4.

Second, it would be a mistake not to see and, even more, to ignore internal conditions and factors of development. To begin with the fact that, despite the successes which have been scored in economic and cultural development by a number of countries in the decades of independence and the relatively abridged gap between the developed capitalist countries and the Third World (predominantly in terms of growth rate), the gulf separating them has not been overcome. Thus Asian and African countries were characterized by quite high growth rates of material production, particularly in industry, in the 1960's-1970's (5.6 percent in the 1960's, 5.4 percent in the 1970's in Asia, 6.7 and 3.2 percent respectively in Africa), and in terms of rate of increase in per capita industrial production they surpassed the industrial centers of capitalism.* By the start of the 1980's many Asian and North African countries had ceased to be agrarian-peasant countries, and in connection with the intensive urbanization processes less than half these countries' gainfully employed population is employed in agriculture now. Nonetheless, the developing countries still lag substantially behind the foremost countries, remaining their dependent economic periphery. If many of them have been able in recent decades to create and develop local industrial production, that is, carry out industrialization (based on the national market here) on this scale or other, the transition to a higher, science-intensive phase of industrial development, which is dictated by the era of the S&T revolution, would appear, owing to the weakness of their intrinsic S&T base, exceptionally difficult for the majority of countries.

As a result the elimination of backwardness and a rise in the living standard of the destitute majority of the people remain most acute national tasks. For this reason the struggle of the classes to overcome backwardness and the protracted crisis in the life of the developing countries would appear to be a struggle for choice of different social development path. Experience has shown that the struggle to eliminate economic backwardness and dependency on the path of capitalist development becomes for the overwhelming majority of developing countries increasingly difficult and can hardly be successful in the foreseeable future.

The problem of financing accelerated economic growth and the rebuilding of the production forces on a modern industrial and engineering basis have proven particularly difficult. Owing to the limited nature of internal sources of accumulation, the developing countries have taken the path of attracting the necessary financial resources from outside and as a result have found themselves very heavily dependent on their former metropolises and the United States. The usurious policy of imperialism has led to a huge growth of their external debt, which amounted in 1985 for all Asian, African and Latin American developing countries to more than \$1 trillion. The need to take new loans to pay off the old debt and interest thereon has created a

* See V.V. Rymalov, "Undermining of Age-Old Foundations," Moscow, 1984, pp 126-127; "The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress," Moscow, 1983, pp 17, 77, 82, 150-151.

"paradoxical mechanism of the self-growth of the foreign debt."* From a factor of an acceleration of economic growth credit has become an impediment thereto.

The exorbitant debt to the imperialist states and international financial institutions is the latest and subtle form of the developing countries' neo-colonial dependency and exploitation. They are confronted with the question: either liberation from the colonial yoke or imperialism or continued dependency. Liberation, of course, will require radical actions both in domestic and foreign policy.

The basic trends and contradictions of development in the countries of belated capitalism born of the regularities of the functioning of capitalism in the era of its historical demise have been ascertained to a sufficient extent in the past decades. World imperialism, remaining imperialism, cannot fail to reproduce relations of inequality in the international division of labor. The developing countries are condemned to remain backward (albeit at a new level) and dependent. And new forms of this dependency have appeared, what is more.**

It is no less important to consider the singularities of the formation and development of national capitalism in the developing countries. As is known, these countries are at different levels of social development. The action of the law of uneven development has led to increased differentiation among them. Some (Turkey, Egypt, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Philippines and certain others) have advanced appreciably along the capitalist path. The overwhelming majority, on the other hand, are merely at the beginning of this path (these are predominantly the Tropical African countries). Whereas in the countries of the first, relatively small group the capitalist structure (national and foreign) has become predominant in the city, is expanding its positions in the countryside and has become or is gradually becoming the predominant mode of production, the other countries are at early levels of capitalist evolution (and even on the threshold thereof); precapitalist (not only feudal but frequently prefeudal also) relations still predominate in them. We would observe in passing that the "dialectical turning point" (V.I. Lenin's term***), that is, transition to capitalism, which has occurred in a number of the most developed Third World countries confronts Marxist thought with new problems: such as the distinctiveness of forms of this transition, the question of a socialist perspective and so forth.

* F. Castro, "The World's Economic and Social Crisis," Moscow, 1983, p 33.

** See "The Developing Countries: Patterns, Trends, Prospects," Moscow, 1974, pp 60-66; "Development Trends of Emergent Countries of the East," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 1, 1982, pp 57-58; "Transnational Corporations in the Capitalist World," *ibid.* No 4, 1982, pp 59-60.

*** See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 47, p 227.

The general and most characteristic feature of all developing countries is, as is known, the multistructural nature of their economy. It is a striking manifestation of the social backwardness of the developing countries and a very considerable impediment en route to their capitalist modernization. Reflecting the protracted transitional state of society, the multistructural condition has assumed in many countries an immobile nature and become a source of impasse features of all social development.*

The key reason why local capitalism, particularly in its private entrepreneurial form, has been incapable in the majority of developing countries of solving the complex social and economic problems confronting them is the fact that it is historically belated. It began to develop here when capitalism on a worldwide scale was a historically passed and transcended level of social evolution, and the capitalist path had ceased to be the sole form of development of the modern productive forces. The belatedness and "tertiary" and "quaternary" nature of capitalism in the emergent countries predetermined its chronic weakness, sickness, instability and dependent nature. For this reason the Western "model" of spontaneous, successive-stage development on an intrinsic and stable basis proved under the new historical conditions groundless and compromised. As was to have been expected, a repetition of the classical path was simply forbidden Afro-Asian capitalism by the objective reality of our era.

Ultimately capitalism in the developing countries (in both its private and public forms), although it has advanced material production, has been unable to fundamentally transform the backward system of national productive forces, social relations and communications, culture and the state in accordance with the national need to achieve economic independence. The rebuilding of the manufacturing sector of national production on an industrial footing and the creation of centers of modern production in agriculture here were carried out in the majority of countries with the active participation of the public sector and the enlistment of foreign capital. Overseas monopolies retain actual control over important spheres of the economy, owning the bulk of a large part of the production machinery. Equally capitalism in the developing countries has not managed, despite certain successes, to achieve the more or less equal and mutually profitable incorporation of the national economies in the international system of the division of labor and exchange. Whence it follows that the limited nature of its possibilities as the driving force of social development has been revealed in all aspects.

Some developing countries, having found themselves under the power of military-dictatorial regimes incapable of tackling economic tasks, are heading toward national catastrophe. And this, as historical experience shows, is precisely the boundary which confronts the peoples squarely with the question of choice of new path of political and social development.

* See A.I. Levkovskiy, "Social Structure of the Developing Countries," Moscow, 1978, pp 9-10, 20-21; "The Developing Countries: Patterns, Trends, Prospects," pp 152-156, 192; "Contradictions of Evolution," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 12, 1981, pp 64-65.

It is well known that a principal lever and generator of capitalist development in the developing countries has been the state and the state sector at its disposal. The sharp growth of the economic role of the state is truly an acute necessity. It was manifested clearly enough in the past in the countries of "second echelon" capitalism (Germany, Russia, Japan). State intervention in the economy is designed in the Third World to make up for the weakness and passivity of local private capital and, mobilizing its countries' material and financial resources, accelerate their economic development. The state in the emergent countries is consequently a "development state".* It has undertaken the elaboration and implementation of plans of national building aimed at the creation of modern large-scale production and its infrastructure, the technical modernization of production, the removal of unevenness and disproportions in the development of individual sectors and areas and so forth. It performs enormous regulating functions, putting into the hands of the state in a number of cases production and exchange, bringing under its control the production and commercial activity of local private and frequently foreign capital (it is the sole counterweight to the imperious management of the transnational corporations) and foreign trade transactions and also intervening in relations between labor and capital. It is also the representative of local (private and state) capital, seeking for it more equal partnership with foreign capital, with the TNC primarily.

In nothing, perhaps, is the social hopelessness of capitalism in the emergent countries manifested so perceptibly as in the crisis of the deformed development path by which it is proceeding. This crisis is to a decisive extent derived from the general crisis of capitalism, which has hit the peripheral and dependent links of the world capitalist system hardest of all. Neocolonialist exploitation, even though combined with imperialism's strategy of stabilizing capitalist development, is intensifying the instability and crisis nature of this development.** At the same time these countries also have their own internal sources of crisis inasmuch as capitalism here, as everywhere, is developing on an antagonistic basis. Particular seriousness is imparted to this crisis in the developing countries by the fact that it has merged with the protracted crisis of the old precapitalist structures. At the same time, however, the possibilities of surmounting the crisis here are very limited in view of the extreme narrowness of the domestic market and the inadequate capacity of national capital for self-development.

The significance of the crisis of capitalism in the developing countries is primarily the fact that, having exacerbated the basic contradiction (between backwardness and dependency and the urgent need for them to be overcome as quickly as possible), it has given rise to new contradictions and conflicts

* See S. Mithra, G. Mirskiy, E. Pakhad, Op. cit., p 57.

** See "The East. Frontier of the 1980's," Moscow, 1983, pp 56-58.

inherent in capitalist development and advanced social problems to the forefront in the life of society.* International consequences of this crisis have been ascertained also. As of the 1980's the economic depression in the developing countries has for the first time begun to exert a reverse negative influence on the economy of the imperialist powers.**

At the same time, however, the growth of local capitalism (national and foreign enterprise) is being accompanied by appreciable social changes, although the social structure of the developing countries preserves the characteristics of a multistructural society. Under the conditions of the multiclass and multistrata nature of society modern classes--the proletariat and bourgeoisie--and, of the social strata--the intelligentsia--are developing the most rapidly.*** The working class is growing more rapidly than the national bourgeoisie here (it also includes workers of enterprises of foreign monopolies and the state sector). It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of this process for the historical destiny of the developing countries--here also the main exponent of the socialist development trend is taking shape in the person of the proletariat. Although the working class here is still relatively small, it is connected by thousands of threads to the countryside and the urban petty bourgeoisie, which is leaving its imprint on the latter's way of thinking, behavior and mentality, and typically proletarian features are showing through increasingly manifestly in its social character. Even now the former is playing a pronounced and ever increasing part in the sociopolitical life of its countries and in the national liberation struggle. Communist parties--consistent fighters for national interests and social progress--are operating in many countries. Nonetheless, the working class in the majority of countries of this group has not yet become the leading force in the revolutionary-liberation movement and in the struggle for choice of new development path. Even in countries of a socialist orientation the class consciousness of the proletariat is growing relatively slowly.****

As before, nonproletarian--peasant and petty bourgeois--strata connected, as a rule, with precapitalist and early-capitalist structures predominate in the general masses of the working class in the underdeveloped countries, as distinct from the Western countries. Their social position is even grimmer than that of the working class. Their lot amounts to the most distorted forms of exploitation and hopeless indigence. In many countries they are still suffering more from an insufficiency of development of capitalism than

* See G.F. Kim, Op. cit., pp 7, 62.

** See V.V. Rymalov, Op. cit., pp 46-47.

*** G.F. Kim, Op. cit., pp 63-64, 70-71, 75-77, 137, 176.

**** See "The Developing Countries: Patterns, Trends, Prospects," pp 71, 268-271; "The Foreign East and the Present Day," vol 1, pp 355-361, 400-401.

from capitalism itself. And, finally, the poverty and pauperism of the millions-strong masses pushed out of the traditional structures and spheres of labor to the cities are adding to the general disastrous picture of the position of the broad people's masses. Whence the growth of social tension in Third World countries.

The present stage of the class and political struggle in the developing countries may be correctly understood only by having discerned therein what is most important: the aspiration of the people's masses to revise the choice of capitalist development path made for them and without their knowledge 20-30 years ago. It is from here that the intensification and enrichment of the social content of the national liberation and the enhancement of the role and place of the developing countries in the world revolutionary process and world politics ensue. A revolutionary movement of a more radical and higher social type (national-democratic or even popular-democratic revolutions) will inevitably grow and is growing in the soil of the incomplete state of the tasks of the national liberation struggle.

As we can see, the formulation of the question of the fate of capitalism in these countries and the choice of new development paths has changed appreciably compared with the period of the 1950's-1970's. Whereas at the time it was a question of forestalling capitalist development, and the alternative--socialism or capitalism--was introduced from outside inasmuch as an adequate internal material and class base was lacking, it is now necessary to take into consideration the experience and consequences of capitalist evolution, the depth of the social contradictions which it has engendered and the correlation of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces in each individual country. Whereas capitalism was at that time rejected as the exponent of colonialism, it is now rejected in many countries as the objective basis and companion of neocolonialism and the culprit of social troubles and lack of rights.

Consciousness of the historical narrowness of the paths of capitalism is penetrating broad strata of the public of the developing countries increasingly deeply. It is becoming increasingly obvious that surmounting the backwardness threshold given continued dependency and reconciliation with neocolonialism will remain a problem which is very difficult to solve for the majority of countries of the Afro-Asian region. All this objectively raises the question of the need for a radical break with neocolonialism and capitalist development which is closely connected therewith and for a reorientation of all social development on new social tracks.

It cannot in this connection be considered precluded that even for the Asian and African countries which have advanced considerably along the capitalist path and which had by the mid-1980's reached the level of mid-development capitalism the choice of a new, socialist path of development, granted all the diversity of versions, will evidently approximate in terms of both form and essence the social choice characteristic in general of countries of this type of capitalist evolution. It could probably be realized by way of a democratic and anti-imperialist revolution growing in the future into a

socialist revolution; a whole number of transitional steps and measures will be required for this, of course.

For the majority of countries of the region the practicable immediate alternative to the capitalism developing here is the noncapitalist path, the path of a socialist orientation. As the new version of the CPSU Program observes, the experience of the countries which have opted for this path "confirms that under current conditions, given the existing correlation of forces in the world, the possibilities of previously enslaved peoples for rejecting capitalism and building their future without exploiters and in the interests of the working people have expanded." This path "coincides with the mainstream of historical development."*

Noncapitalist development within the framework of the modern era is a natural process. But an "abridged" path to socialism, circumventing capitalism, does not exempt any given country (or group of countries) from the need to have a material-production and spiritual-cultural base adequate to socialism. Without this, socialism is inconceivable. Whence it follows that a more or less prolonged, depending on specific-historical conditions, period of the creation of the material and cultural prerequisites of socialism is essential, that is, completion of the "work" which in capitalist countries has been done more or less fully by capitalism is necessary. The foundations for the elimination of economic and cultural backwardness are laid in the course of this "work".

The historical function of the noncapitalist path as a whole and particular period of development is, consequently, to lay the material and social basis for subsequent gradual movement toward socialism. The path of noncapitalist development toward socialism making it possible to bypass the phase of mature capitalism is practicably possible for all developing countries which have opted for a socialist future.

The main lever of the change to a noncapitalist path is the state, whose social nature must correspond to the interests of the people's masses. To ensure the emergence of such a state a national-democratic revolution which removes from power reactionary, bourgeois and pro-bourgeois circles and puts at the helm of state revolutionaries devoted to the people is essential. The decisive condition of the victory of this revolution is the active participation therein of the broad people's masses.

In the course of "presocialist transformations"** the state and cooperative sectors of the economy become public sectors--of a transitional, semisocialist nature--and the leading force and basis of socioeconomic development. The other structures--private capitalist and precapitalist--are gradually

* PRAVDA, 7 March 1986.

** N.A. Simoniya, "Countries of the East: Development Paths," Moscow, 1975, p 358.

transformed in a socialist direction with the maximum use of their production possibilities and the curtailment of negative trends. The domination of foreign capital is limited and subsequently eliminated. In the sphere of social policy measures are adopted to satisfy the paramount needs of the working people (the struggle against unemployment, illiteracy and so forth). The past social inequality is overcome on the basis of transformations of the social structure of society and an upsurge of the working people's living standard. The economic bases of patriarchalism and medievalism are removed, and the socio-psychological mechanisms actively impeding progress (the caste system, ethnic barriers and so forth) are done away with.* An indispensable condition and guarantee of success for movement along the noncapitalist path is close and all-around cooperation with the socialist countries.

The leading role in the national-democratic revolutions is performed by revolutionary democracy, which has experienced the ideological influence of Marxism or is gradually switching to its theoretical and political standpoints. It is with its activity that the choice by a comparatively large group of developing countries of a socialist orientation is connected. The latter is nothing other than the result of the political choice thereof by the new revolutionary power, the choice of desired direction of impending sociopolitical development.

Among the countries which have opted for a socialist orientation two groups have now manifestly been determined differing not in terms of "length of service" but of degree of depth of social transformations and participation in the revolutionary process of the broad people's masses. In one of them the socialist orientation was proclaimed "from above," so to speak: either after the victory of the national liberation revolution and the accession to power of national or revolutionary democracy or as a result of a military coup or coup d'etat carried out by progressive officers with the sympathy or support of the people. In these countries the social transformations ensuing from the socialist orientation are frequently implemented inconsistently and at a slow pace, with a look back at the local influential propertied classes, and are mainly confined to a general democratic framework and, what is most important, without the active participation of the people's masses. Mistaken notions concerning the possibility of an extra-class way to socialism decked out in the uniform of various "original" forms of socialism sometimes serve as the ideological basis of the socialist orientation here. This does not expand but, on the contrary, engenders weakness of the popular mass base and the fragility of the entire policy of progressive transformations, despite the spontaneous anticapitalist mood and sympathy of the masses.

In the second group of countries, where the socialist orientation was established as a result of the victory of popular national-democratic revolutions, the revolutionary process is directed by vanguard parties oriented toward scientific socialism; the broad people's masses are enlisted in the conscious

* See "Theoretical Problems of the Transition to Socialism of Countries with an Underdeveloped Economy," Moscow, 1983, pp 79-80.

and constant participation in social transformations; the transformations are distinguished by scale, radicalism, depth and anticapitalist focus here; and the revolutionary leadership is fully resolved to advance along the noncapitalist path, not losing sight of the socialist perspective. These transformations by nature approximate transformations of the popular-democratic type.*

Thus historical experience has confirmed once again that a genuine choice of new, progressive path is inseparable from the victory of a national-democratic revolution.

Granted the difference in states of a socialist orientation which has been mentioned, common for them are the tasks of a break with the old, semicolonial and precapitalist relations, the elimination of backwardness and dependency and the creation of new, progressive socioeconomic structures and an efficient and independent industrially developed economy and also the task of an acceleration of the economic growth rate in the interests of a rise in the people's living standard.

Inasmuch as the movement along the path of a socialist orientation starts for the countries which have opted for such from the same backward economic and social level of development as the majority of countries of a capitalist orientation, they have in the economic and social reconstruction process to overcome similar difficulties and solve similar problems. But the fundamental difference is that the countries of a socialist orientation approach (or should approach) their solution in revolutionary-democratic fashion, while the countries of the capitalist path resolve them in a bourgeois-reformist manner, and frequently from conservative positions even (in countries where military-dictatorial regimes are in power). In countries of a noncapitalist development path bold, revolutionary reforms, which gradually realize and consolidate the fruits of the revolutions, are the main method of transformations. These reforms complete the anti-imperialist transformations and are spearheaded at the accomplishment of antifeudal and anticapitalist tasks.

As experience shows, noncapitalist development and the creation of a modern economic basis and progressive political superstructure encounter even bigger difficulties of an external and internal nature than development along the capitalist path. Thus inasmuch as the countries of a socialist orientation remain within the orbit of the world capitalist economy they experience the strong pressure (economic and political) of imperialism. In addition, subversive actions on the part of imperialism, U.S. primarily, have become more frequent in recent years, which is forcing many young states to divert already limited resources for the defense of the progressive and independent development of their countries against the encroachments of imperialism and internal reaction.

* See "The East: Frontier of the 1980's," p 179.

At the same time instances of a departure from the proclaimed progressive path and a return to a pro-bourgeois neocolonialist development path (Egypt, Somalia and so forth) are by no means rare. "The logic of social delineation and social progress in the developing countries is such," a Soviet scholar writes, "that individual retreats or recoils are a by-product of progressive development."* The problem of irreversibility of the choice of a socialist orientation is very acute. And having emerged as a result of a "summit" revolution which has not developed into a people's revolution, it always contains a trend toward reverse movement and the possibility of the reversibility of events. Only radical political and socioeconomic transformations, given the unfailing development of the revolutionary initiative and energy of the people and the transition of the vanguard party to the positions of scientific communism, and also an appreciable growth of the economy can be the guarantee of successful advance along the noncapitalist path.

The acute class and political struggle for final choice of socialist development path in these countries continues, at times flaring up with new force. Thus it was in Algeria in 1976, for example, on the eve of discussion and adoption of the National Charter, which confirmed the socialist choice. The struggle for this progressive choice against private capitalist circles attempting with the support of the imperialists to push this country aside from the path of a socialist orientation has intensified even in recent years.** This struggle expresses the intensified confrontation of socialist and capitalist development trends. Struggle, and only struggle will ultimately decide the fate of the socialist orientation.

The stage of noncapitalist development in countries of a socialist orientation may culminate successfully, and the socialist choice will be fruitful only with the transition to direct socialist development. And this presupposes the development of the national-democratic (or popular-democratic) revolution into socialist revolution.

Summing up, it may be said that a socialist orientation, despite all difficulties and obstacles of an objective and subjective nature, has become firmly established in the social life of a whole group of Asian and African countries as a new path of social development leading to socialism. The course of social development in recent decades in the emergent Asian and African countries has introduced new features to the formation and solution of the problem of their peoples' choice of new, progressive paths thereof. The old factors making it possible to bypass capitalism or interrupt its development, having embarked on the noncapitalist path, hold good for many countries. At the same time new possibilities of choice of paths based on the ripening crisis of social relations which took shape as a result of the

* G.F. Kim, Op. cit., p 134.

** See Ali Makli, "Algeria--Growth of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 4, 1978, p 47; Mahmud Ben Taleb, "Defending the Progressive Choice," ibid. No 12, 1984, pp 72-76.

odd synthesis of the modern and traditional structures have emerged as the result of the development of capitalism in the group of countries of a capitalist orientation. The historically unprecedented backwardness of these countries serves, as before, as a powerful catalyst of all internal processes and the exacerbation of social contradictions. The distinctiveness of the revolutionary process in the countries of the East in view of the considerably greater diversity of social conditions than in Europe, which was noted by V.I. Lenin,* and the multivariance of social development are not being smoothed over but are increasing, and this is leaving its imprint on the forms of choice of paths toward socialism and the methods and rate of movement in this direction.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1986

8850

CSO: 1807/385

* See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 45, p 381.

USSR-NONALIGNED MOVEMENT'S PRINCIPLES SHOWN TO COINCIDE

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 86 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 28-36

[Article by R.A. Tuzmukhamedov: "Twenty-five Years of the Nonaligned Movement"]

[Excerpts] The new version of the CPSU Program adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress says: "The CPSU approaches with understanding the goals and activity of the nonaligned movement and supports an enhancement of its role in world politics."*

The idea of nonalignment grew in the soil of the liberation of peoples from colonialism. Its founder was J. Nehru, who advanced it (originally as "freedom from obligations") as a means of strengthening the independence of peoples who had acquired state sovereignty. The organized nonaligned movement was inaugurated by the First Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries in the fall of 1961 in Belgrade. Its initiators were the "fathers of nonalignment"--J. Nehru, J.B. Tito, J.A. Nasir, A. Sukarno and K. Nkrumah.

Since the time it emerged the movement has been an integral component and factor of the struggle against the policy of imperialism and against all manifestations of inequality in relations between states and a factor of the struggle for peace and international security.

The political and socio-historical essence of the idea of nonalignment as its most striking spokesmen have expressed it has never amounted to a mere "nonparticipation in blocs". Indira Gandhi, who died tragically in the office of chairman and coordinator of the movement, said not long before her death: "Nonalignment means national independence and freedom."** Indian Prime

* PRAVDA, 7 March 1986.

** UN Doc. A/38/132, Appendix, p 174.

Minister Rajiv Gandhi emphasized at an extraordinary session of the Coordination Bureau of the nonaligned movement in 1985: "All that offends against peace, all that infringes countries' freedom, all that intensifies international economic inequality--all this concerns the nonaligned movement."*

That nonalignment is a political-diplomatic means of strengthening independence has been noted in the movement's documents repeatedly. Its goals also are defined accordingly. Thus the Political Declaration of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries Seventh Session (Delhi, 1983) records that, as adherents to the ideals of peace throughout the world, justice and cooperation, the nonaligned countries pursue the goals of "an end to imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, the elimination of apartheid and racism, including Zionism, and all forms of foreign domination, aggression, intervention, occupation and pressure, an acceleration of the process of the self-determination of peoples under colonial and foreign domination, a strengthening of states' national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and also the social and economic development of their peoples."** Documents of the movement have repeatedly confirmed fidelity to the principles of peaceful coexistence. The movement incorporates within it states belonging to different social systems (in particular, five socialist countries--Vietnam, the DPRK, Cuba, Laos and Yugoslavia--and all countries of a socialist orientation participate in it) and is the biggest association of states championing the above-mentioned principles after the United Nations.

The general democratic character and political thrust of the essence and aims of nonalignment have been confirmed by life itself. It is primarily thanks to them that the movement's ranks have grown rapidly in the 25 years. The number of its full participants has increased more than fourfold. There are participants in Asia (29), Africa (51), Latin America (18), Europe (3), and Oceania (1).

An organizational mechanism of the movement has taken shape and functions in the form of the Conference of Heads of State or Government meeting every 3 years, the Foreign Minister Conference, whose sessions are usually held every 18 months, the Coordination Bureau, which is in session as necessary, the plenary meeting of delegation heads at UN General Assembly sessions, the plenary conference of UN permanent representatives and also a number of other, so-called secondary bodies of the movement--the Press Agency Pool, regular sectoral minister meetings and so forth.

* "Inaugural Address by Shri Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of Coordination Bureau," New Delhi, 19 April 1985, p 14.

** UN Doc. A/38/132, Political Declaration, section 9.

The past quarter-century has shown convincingly that, entering international relations as a factor of peace, the movement responds actively to the most important world problems and is objectively, as a whole, on the side of the main driving forces of contemporary social development--world socialism, the international worker and communist movement, the peoples of the emergent countries and the mass democratic movements. And the more assertive the movement shows itself to be, the higher its international authority.

This can be clearly seen in the example of the positions which the movement occupies in the most important spheres of contemporary world politics.

1. Primarily the struggle to strengthen peaceful coexistence. "Any existence whatever is possible only under conditions of coexistence," Indira Gandhi emphasized.*

The nonaligned movement took shape under the slogan of peaceful coexistence. Its constituent congress in Belgrade recorded in its declaration the historic words: "The principles of peaceful coexistence are the sole alternative to the 'cold war' and possible general nuclear catastrophe.... These principles... must be the sole basis of all international relations."** It expanded and strengthened under the slogan of struggle for peaceful coexistence. And the Political Declaration of the conference's Seventh Session recorded: "It is becoming increasingly apparent today that there is no way other than a policy of peaceful coexistence, detente and cooperation between states, regardless of the differences in their economic and social systems, size and geographical location."***

Endeavoring to belittle the fundamental significance of the principles of peaceful coexistence for the nonaligned countries' foreign policy, Western political scientists frequently assert that there is no point in the non-aligned countries endlessly reiterating words of fidelity to these principles inasmuch as they are already recorded in the UN Charter and that the participants in the movement are members thereof. The groundlessness of such an argument is that the mere fact of official recognition of UN principles does not preclude, as experience shows, imperialism's dangerous infringement of the principles of international peace and security. For example, the policy adopted by U.S. ruling circles in recent years is in glaring contradiction to the principles of peaceful coexistence. The practice of international relations shows that deeds and action in support of peace are needed to ensure peaceful coexistence. The nonaligned movement is constantly mobilizing its

* UN Doc. A/38/132. Appendix, p 179.

** "The Nonaligned Movement in Documents and Material," 2nd supplemented and revised edition, R.A. Tuzmukhamedov, compiler and author of introductory article. Moscow, 1979, p 55 (subsequently "The Nonaligned Movement," 1979).

*** UN Doc. A/38/132. Political Declaration, section 17.

powers for this. The nonaligned movement is obliged for the unprecedented growth of its ranks and its high authority in the world to its consistent advocacy on the world scene of peaceful coexistence.

The principle of peaceful coexistence also has for the nonaligned countries an internal aspect, as it were. In advocating a strengthening of peaceful coexistence the movement has always also referred to relations between its participants themselves. However, far from always felicitously from this viewpoint. The protracted fratricidal war between nonaligned Iran and nonaligned Iraq, for example, testifies to this. Mention also has to be made of the policy of the present Pakistani leadership. Pakistan's relations with neighboring India--the biggest nonaligned country and chairman of the movement--can hardly be called relations of genuine peace and cooperation, and its involvement in the undeclared war against Afghanistan in keeping with the principle of peaceful coexistence. The interconnection between realization of the movement's demands for peaceful coexistence globally and their implementation in relations between participants in the movement is indisputable and obvious. The stronger the peace and cooperation within the framework of the movement, the greater its authority on the world scene as a factor of peace. For this reason, for example, the Indian Government's peaceable initiatives aimed at a normalization of relations with Pakistan are contributing to the movement's efforts geared to a strengthening of peaceful coexistence and international security.

The nonaligned countries have always regarded the freedom of colonial peoples an inalienable component of the very essence of peaceful coexistence. And on this question their position is shared by the Soviet Union. This was how V.I. Lenin imagined peaceful coexistence also. In its first foreign policy enactment--the Decree on Peace--the Soviet state demanded peace based on the freedom of the peoples; it has always sought to ensure that the principle of the peoples' self-determination be recognized as a principle of peaceful coexistence.

The nonaligned movement has done much to promote in conformity with its economic, military and, particularly, moral-political possibilities the peoples' liberation from colonialism. The admittance to the movement's ranks of organizations which are the true representatives of their peoples and which head their liberation struggle--the PLO, SWAPO, the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front (before this country gained independence)--may serve as an example. A new form of support for such organizations--granting their representatives special status in the country in which they reside, as far as diplomatic--as the Indian Government, for example, did in respect of SWAPO in April 1985--has also become prevalent thanks to the nonaligned movement.

The practice of the nonaligned movement's struggle for peaceful coexistence has engendered one further important direction of operations--struggle for "economic security". Zimbabwean President R. Mugabe said during his visit to Moscow that the people "should be not only master of their country but also master of their economy for political power without economic power is

nothing."* In the modern world economic security is most closely bound up with the global interests of the defense of peace. As the USSR Government memorandum "States' International Economic Security--Important Condition of an Improvement of International Economic Relations" observed, the leading capitalist states have in recent years been jeopardizing states' economic security, blocking an improvement of international economic relations and their rebuilding on a just, democratic foundation and undermining international economic security. The memorandum emphasized that international economic security is an integral part of international security as a whole.** The nonaligned movement also invariably adheres to such positions. Equal, nondiscriminatory international cooperation is the material basis of peaceful coexistence and a guarantee of a strengthening of international security.

2. From the very outset the nonaligned movement emerged as a force seeking "the exclusion of war as an instrument of policy in international relations."*** Having incorporated this proposition in their Belgrade declaration, the nonaligned countries called on the UN General Assembly to convene a special session or world conference on disarmament. Even then, in 1961, the movement was paying special attention to the question of nuclear disarmament, as, equally, to the elimination of all other types and weapons of people's mass annihilation. General and complete disarmament "must include a complete ban on the production, possession and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and bacteriological and chemical arms and also destruction of the equipment and installations deployed on national territory and intended for the delivery and operational use of weapons of mass annihilation."****

Unfortunately, in past years the arms race has not abated, through the fault of imperialism. The nonaligned countries' growing concern is therefore understandable. The Seventh Session of the movement's conference recorded in a special section of the Political Declaration "Questions of Disarmament, Survival and Coexistence in the Age of Nuclear Weapons": "The greatest danger to peace is today the threat of the annihilation of mankind in a nuclear war. Disarmament, nuclear disarmament particularly, is no longer an ethical problem, it has become a problem of mankind's survival."*****

The recent Soviet initiatives aimed at strengthening international trust are also within the channel of the nonaligned movement's demands. In 1985 the USSR proposed halving the nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching one another's territory, imposed a moratorium on nuclear

* PRAVDA, 3 December 1985.

** PRAVDA, 28 January 1986.

*** "The Nonaligned Movement," 1979, p 53.

**** Ibid., p 59.

***** UN Doc. A/38/132, p 19.

testing and consented to a unilateral reduction in the number of intermediate-range missiles in place in Europe. A comprehensive program of major foreign policy actions of a fundamental nature dictated by the need to overcome the growing confrontational trends and clear the way to a winding down of the nuclear arms race on earth and its prevention in space, including a specific program with a definite time frame of the complete gradual elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world, was formulated in the statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, issued in January 1986.* The decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress are imbued with concern for preserving peace and stopping mankind's slide toward nuclear catastrophe.

Questions of war and peace, "questions of survival have been put at the center of world politics"** by the very course of world development, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at the press conference in Geneva. As the leaders of six countries of four continents declared in October 1985 in a joint message to M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, the prevention of nuclear war "is the key question not only for your peoples and for their destiny but also for the peoples of all continents."***

3. Under the conditions of the threat of militarization of space being created by the United States and its allies the nonaligned countries actively support the struggle of the USSR and other socialist countries for a peaceful space. Back in the 1961 Belgrade Declaration they appealed to all states, "particularly those engaged at the present time in the exploration of outer space, to use it solely for peaceful purposes" and expressed the hope that "the international community, acting collectively, will institute an international body for the purpose of developing and coordinating actions in the sphere of international cooperation for the peaceful use of outer space."****

The meeting of ministers and delegation heads of the nonaligned countries in October 1984 at the UN General Assembly 39th Session condemned the steps aimed at the militarization of outer space "by way of the use of new types of technology, the construction of systems of defense against nuclear weapons and the achievement of strategic superiority in new generations of offensive and defensive weapons systems."***** The Political Declaration adopted at the conference of nonaligned countries' foreign ministers in Luanda in September 1985 expressed approval of the Soviet-American accord of 8 January 1985 on the examination of questions concerning space and nuclear arms in

* PRAVDA, 16 January 1986.

** PRAVDA, 22 November 1985.

*** PRAVDA, 30 October 1985.

**** "The Nonaligned Movement," 1979, p 59.

***** UN Doc. A/39/560, Appendix, p 8.

their interconnection for the purpose of preventing an arms race in space and a halt thereto on earth. In this document the ministers confirmed "the principle of the use of outer space, which is the general property of mankind, solely for peaceful purposes for the good and in the interests of all countries, regardless of their level of economic, social and scientific development, and the need for free access for all states." The participants in the meeting called on all states to "immediately adopt measures to prevent the transference of the arms race to outer space in order to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security."*

4. An important unifying factor of the nonaligned movement was and remains their (sic) common interest in the creation of international conditions conducive to their development, economic primarily.

The young states emerged on the international scene burdened with the grim legacy of the colonial past. They declared at their first, Belgrade, conference that "efforts must be made to do away with the economic inequality inherited from colonialism and imperialism" and advocated "the establishment of just relations in the sphere of trade with the developing countries" and that the fruits of S&T progress "be put at the service of economic development for an acceleration of the process of restoration of social justice internationally."**

However, the years which have elapsed since then have shown that the appeals of the participants in the movement for the elimination of the discrepancy in development level between the emergent countries and the industrially developed Western countries have found no response among the latter. The transnational monopolies have done and continue to do everything to preserve their positions in the developing countries.

The extent of the relative deterioration of the emergent countries' domestic and international situation is attested by the size of their foreign debt, which has reached an astronomical figure--more than \$1 trillion. Interest payments alone are measured in the huge sum of over \$120 billion. This debt is accelerating. F. Castro rightly termed this debt illegal and immoral. The debt is created as a result of plunder and, in turn, becomes an instrument of plunder. Such expressions as "economic security," "technological colonialism" and "economic aggression" have perfectly justifiably become a part of the international political vocabulary. They convey the essence of imperialist policy of exploitation of the emergent countries and the policy of neocolonialism.

* UN Doc. A/40/854, Political Declaration, section 34.

** "The Nonaligned Movement," 1979, p 60.

It is therefore understandable that the task of struggle for the economic independence and progress of the developing countries has in recent years been moved to the forefront in the activity of the nonaligned movement. The Luanda Declaration (1985) observed that the international economic situation "is characterized by a further increase in the discrepancy between the developing and developed countries, which is, as before, a source of instability threatening international peace and security."*

The Soviet Union agrees with the nonaligned movement in its evaluation of the world economic situation. It considers the unequal position of the young states in international economic relations a most important global problem. The growing discrepancy between the handful of highly developed capitalist and the vast majority of developing countries contains a serious danger to peace as a whole. The attention of the UN secretary general, in particular, was called to this in the above-mentioned USSR Government memorandum "States' International Economic Security--Important Condition of an Improvement in Economic Relations".

It should be mentioned here that the Soviet Union to no extent bears responsibility for the backwardness of the emergent countries and their present difficult economic situation. While setting and tackling tremendous social and economic tasks within the country the Soviet Union assists as far as possible the victims of imperialism's aggressive economic policy. The new version of the CPSU Program notes particularly that the CPSU supports the Asian, African and Latin American countries' struggle against imperialism and the oppression of the transnational monopolies and for the assertion of the sovereign right to dispose of their own resources, the rebuilding of international relations on an equal, democratic basis, the creation of a new international economic order and deliverance from the debt bondage imposed by the imperialists. This general line had already been embodied in the "Guidelines of the USSR's Economic and Social Development in 1986-1990 and the Period up to the Year 2000" also. This document points specially to the need to extend cooperation with the developing countries and determines that the Soviet Union will, in development of the level and scale of cooperation which have already been reached, assist them in the construction of industrial facilities, improvement of transport, the mechanization of agriculture and irrigation of the land, geological prospecting for mineral raw material and fuel reserves, the training of national personnel and in other spheres. It is a question of assisting the development of the spheres of the young states' economic and social life on whose consolidation the strengthening of their independence and their stable, accelerated progress primarily depend.

Of course, by virtue of historical conditions, the volume of the USSR's cooperation with the developing countries in the economic sphere is not as great as the latter's relations with their former metropolises and with the capitalist world generally. However, past years have shown as convincingly as can be the disinterestedness of the USSR and the mutually profitable

* UN Doc. A/40/854, Economic Declaration, section 1.

nature and paramount importance of this cooperation for consolidating the nonaligned countries' independence. The USSR's cooperation with India may serve as convincing confirmation of this. Some 58 industrial and other facilities have been created and a further 30 are planned or are being built in 30 years here with the USSR's assistance; they include foundries and engineering plants, oil refineries, power stations and others.* The successful development of economic and S&T cooperation between the USSR and India, R. Gandhi observed, "is an example of equal relations and graphically demonstrates the fruitfulness and effectiveness of relations between states with different social systems."**

Owing to objective circumstances, the development of the USSR's relations with African countries began considerably later than with independent Asia, but here also they are serving the cause of the independence and progress of the young nonaligned states. Zimbabwean President R. Mugabe said in this connection: "Our two countries are developing mutually profitable cooperation in various fields, particularly in the cultural, political, diplomatic and economic spheres, where we, the young Republic of Zimbabwe... see the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as an example, source of inspiration and, to be candid, reference point."***

The USSR was and remains a loyal supporter of the emergent countries in their solution of development problems. In contrast to the neocolonialist policy of the imperialist powers, it is doing everything possible to assist this development.

5. Today the nonaligned movement is an active participation in and, in a number of cases, the initiator of the discussion of vitally important so-called global problems troubling all mankind and exerting an appreciable influence on its development prospects. We have already spoken of the non-aligned countries' participation in the solution of the main problem--ensuring international peace and security--and noted their contribution to the struggle to overcome economic backwardness. Tremendous significance is attached to the nonaligned movement's participation in the discussion and solution of such problems as the elimination of vast zones of starvation, poverty, epidemic disease and illiteracy; catering for man's growing energy, raw material and food resource requirements; and protection of man's habitable environment and peaceful conquest of the oceans and space. In complete accord with numerous statements of the movement and the corresponding provisions of the main documents of its conferences, the socialist community countries, for their part, have repeatedly called on the international community to embark by joint efforts on a solution of these problems. "If these problems are not solved by the joint efforts of the world community," a

* See PRAVDA, 1 February 1985.

** PRAVDA, 2 February 1985.

*** PRAVDA, 3 December 1985.

Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee statement (1985) says, "their further exacerbation and the formation of new sources of international tension are inevitable."*

While struggling for equality and equal rights in international affairs the participants in the nonaligned movement recognize that this equality and equal rights do not mean merely identity of rights. They also mean responsibility, the more so, the more important the problems it concerns. The founders and, at that time, leaders of the movement recorded in the Belgrade Declaration: "At this time no state and no government can absolve themselves of responsibility for peace throughout the world."**

The world situation has become considerably more complex since then. Accordingly, states' responsibility has risen also. "What the Geneva negotiations dealt with, that is, the goals and subject of the negotiations," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at a press conference at the end of the Geneva summit, "are the concern of all peoples. Responsible politicians, primarily state leaders, must occupy a firm constructive position on this question. This would be of tremendous significance."***

The nonaligned movement encounters in the person of the Soviet Union in all this a loyal and active partner. The USSR's fundamental position in respect of the movement's role was formulated in the new version of the CPSU Program. The party advocates the emergent states' full participation in international affairs and their increased contribution to the solution of the most important present-day problems. "We value highly the constructive initiatives displayed by the Asian socialist countries, India and other participants in the nonaligned movement," the 15 January 1986 statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said.****

The fact that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have concluded political treaties of a new kind--peace, friendship and cooperation treaties --with a number of nonaligned states is of essential significance. More than 50 such agreements have been signed. These are not simply equal agreements. They recognize the course of nonalignment in world politics, and it thereby acquires great force, and respect therefore on the part of the socialist countries is consolidated.

* PRAVDA, 24 October 1985.

** "The Nonaligned Movement," 1979, p 53.

*** PRAVDA, 22 November 1985.

**** PRAVDA, 16 January 1986.

Like any large-scale international phenomenon, the nonaligned movement, which has grown rapidly and unites countries which differ in terms of level of their development, social and political structure, ideological principles and traditions, is encountering certain difficulties in its activity and complex internal problems. They are being intensified by the subtle subversive actions of imperialist circles endeavoring to disunite the nonaligned countries and counterpose them to one another on certain acute questions of international life. However, the strengthening of the movement and its unity in its approach to fundamental present-day problems are an obvious fact. The past quarter-century has confirmed the soundness of the proposition formulated in the Belgrade Declaration that "the very existence and activity of the nonaligned countries in the interests of peace are a most important factor of peace throughout the world."*

The Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries are consistently pursuing a policy of cooperation with the nonaligned movement. "Tremendous significance for an improvement in international relations," M.S. Gorbachev said, "is attached to interaction with the nonaligned movement."** As collective documents of the Warsaw Pact states have pointed out repeatedly here, the socialist states fully respect the independence of this movement and the principles on which it is based.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"

Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1986

8850

CSO: 1807/385

* "The Nonaligned Movement," 1979, p 56.

** PRAVDA, 28 November 1985.

CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE REORIENTATION--PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 86 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 37-46

[Article by S.S. Tsyplakov: "The PRC's Foreign Trade--Problems and Prospects"]

[Text] The PRC has in recent years increased attention considerably to the development of trade-economic contacts with the outside world to speed up the modernization of the economy. Tracing the evolution of PRC policy in foreign trade would seem important in this connection.

The foreign trade policy of the PRC has passed through several stages in the time of its existence. In the first decade following the formation of the PRC its trade-economic relations were oriented toward the socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union. This cooperation was of exceptional importance for creating the foundations of the PRC's industrial base and the rapid development of the country's economy. The supplies to China of machinery and equipment from the USSR went beyond the framework of conventional trading transactions; they incorporated credit relations, assistance in the installation of industrial enterprises, technical cooperation and personnel training. All this contributed to the creation in China of an integral industrial structure.¹ The huge scale of the Soviet Union's assistance to the PRC is attested by the fact that in 1960 enterprises designed and built with the USSR's assistance manufactured 30 percent of the pig iron, approximately 70 percent of the steel, over 50 percent of the rolled metal, 25 percent of aluminum, 80 percent of the trucks, more than 90 percent of the tractors, 30 percent of the synthetic ammonia, 25 percent of electric power, 55 percent of steam and hydraulic turbines, approximately 20 percent of the generators and more than 10 percent of the product of heavy engineering industry as a whole.² In the 1950's the PRC also obtained considerable assistance from the other socialist countries also, and in the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) alone they supplied 100 complete sets of factory-plant equipment.³

The importance for China of cooperation with the socialist countries was noted repeatedly by the Chinese leaders themselves. Thus as Li Fuchun, vice premier of the PRC State Council, emphasized: "Our estimate, and this is a firm estimate, what is more, is such: the enterprises designed and built in our country with the Soviet Union's assistance are truly the embodiment of everything modern and the very best that the Soviet Union possesses. These enterprises are the backbone of our industry, backbone not only in terms of volume but also the level of modern progressive equipment."⁴

The growth of trade-economic relations with the USSR and other socialist countries dashed the hopes of world imperialism, American primarily, which had been attempting by way of blockades and embargoes to undermine the PRC economy. The equal, mutually profitable economic exchanges with the socialist countries contributed to the rapid progressive development of the PRC's foreign trade as a whole. In the period 1950-1960 the country's foreign trade turnover increased from \$1.13 billion to \$3.81 billion, that is, by a factor of more than 3.3.⁵ As a whole the 1950's were a most propitious period in the development of China's foreign trade.

However, the following decade there was a considerable reorientation of the country's foreign trade relations. The PRC leadership's policy of a winding down of economic relations with the socialist countries came to be manifested increasingly distinctly as of the start of the 1960's. This process occurred so actively that in 1966 even China had suspended completely S&T and production cooperation with the USSR and had cut back the amount of bilateral trade considerably. Simultaneously purchases of diverse industrial equipment in the capitalist countries began. At the same time, however, foreign trade, like the country's entire economy, was feeling the influence of a number of unfavorable factors, among which we should distinguish particularly, first, the consequences of the "Great Leap Forward," which continued to be felt in the first half of the 1960's, and, second, the "Cultural Revolution," which was accompanied by serious malfunctions in the development of the national economy. Considerable damage to the PRC's trade exchange with foreign countries was caused by the economic policy of the then leadership, which proceeded from the principle of "reliance on one's own forces," by which was understood the creation of a self-sufficient model of the economy practically unconnected with the outside world. The "concept of the creation of an industrial structure entirely independent of the outside world" is now categorized by Chinese economists as "a primitive, simplistic approach to economic problems."⁶

The political and economic upheavals, recklessness in economic policy and the abandonment of mutually profitable economic cooperation with the USSR and the majority of other socialist countries impeded the expansion of the PRC's trade relations with the outside world in the 1960's. In 1969 the volume of exports and imports was less than in 1959.⁷

In the 1970's the PRC's foreign trade developed under the influence of diverse factors. Chinese economists themselves ascribe the period up to 1976 to the time of the so-called "10-year chaos" (1966-1976), noting that tremendous damage was done to the country's economy at that time and that economic policy continued to be constructed in accordance with the "reliance on one's own forces" concept. At the same time the PRC could not in practice, of course, have renounced the acquisition abroad of modern machinery and equipment and technology and the use of overseas production experience, and this forced it into contacts with the outside world.⁸ As a result the scale of the PRC's trade relations with foreign countries noticeably expanded in the first half of the 1970's: in 1975 the volume of exports and imports amounted to \$14.75 billion compared with \$4.59 billion in 1970.⁹ The country's foreign trade as a whole could not be called developed. In 1973-1974 China was in 15th place in the world in terms of value of foreign trade turnover, but had dropped to 25th place in 1975.¹⁰ Foreign trade lagged behind other components of the national economic complex since in terms of a number of most important economic indicators China had joined the world's 10 most industrially developed countries. The country's economic requirements insistently demanded an acceleration of the development of foreign economic relations. This necessity became even more urgent following the advancement in 1978 of a program for the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and defense, which from the very outset incorporated as an important task an expansion of trade-economic relations with foreign countries.

Thus as of 1978 the PRC's foreign trade entered a new stage of its development, a particular feature of which has been increased attention to the role of external factors in the modernization of the economy. The new evaluation of the influence of external factors on the economy logically led to a departure from the "reliance on one's own forces" concept in the form in which it had been understood in the 1960's. Assertions began to appear in the Chinese press and the declarations of statesmen that the principles of "independence and self-sufficiency" and "reliance on one's own forces" had been interpreted mistakenly and had been counterposed to the policy of the development of relations with foreign countries.¹¹ At the same time the "reliance on one's own forces" slogan continued, at least formally, to be upheld. Addressing the Fifth National People's Congress Fourth Session on 30 November 1981, PRC State Council Premier Zhao Ziyang noted that "relations with the outside world, an expansion of foreign trade, the enlistment of new technology, the use of foreign capital and also the development of various types of international economic and technical cooperation--all of this is to China's benefit... and can in no way impede but only contribute to an improvement in the country's possibilities of reliance on its own forces." It was concluded from this reasoning that in developing the economy China "should use two types of resources, first, domestic, second, international, and develop two markets--primarily domestic and subsequently international."¹²

These propositions were points of departure in the quest for a strategy of the development of the PRC's foreign economic relations on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's. An important feature in this process was promotion of the so-called "open foreign economic policy"¹³ as the main concept of the PRC's economic contacts with the outside world. The 12th CCP Congress termed its implementation "the country's invariable strategic course," and the main purpose of this course was defined as "strengthening of the country's intrinsic possibilities and stimulation of the development of the national economy."¹⁴ Development of the entire set of foreign economic relations, primarily trade, is contemplated for the achievement of this purpose.

The start of implementation of the "open foreign economic policy" by no means signifies, however, that China has fully formulated the strategy of the use of external factors in economic development. On the contrary, Chinese leaders' statements testify that the search in this direction continues. In the report on the government's work at the Sixth National People's Congress Second Session in May 1984 Zhao Ziyang said that the technical revolution under way in the world "is both an opportunity and a challenge for the country's economic development"; China "must avail itself of this opportunity and, employing the new technical and scientific achievements, close the technical and economic gap between it and the developed countries. The main task in this sphere is to formulate the correct strategy of technical development."¹⁵ The decisions of the 12th CCP Central Committee Third Plenum (October 1984), which adopted a decree on "reform of the economic system," were a new step forward in this direction. The "open foreign economic policy" is defined therein as "the long-term, basic state policy"; demands for the "full use of external resources and a reform of foreign trade" and "an expansion of the scale of economic and technical exchange with foreign countries"¹⁶ are advanced.

The statements of the top Chinese leaders, party-state documents and the PRC's practical steps in the sphere of foreign economic relations permit the belief that the elaboration of a program of the use of external factors as an important lever in the modernization of the national economy has begun in the country. In addition to principles of a general nature specific reference points of the development of economic exchange with the outside world were advanced. Thus a set task is that of having increased foreign trade turnover to \$160 billion by the year 2000, that is, having increased it fourfold compared with the level of the start of the 1980's.¹⁷ In the Sixth Five-year Plan (1981-1985) the trade volume is to have grown 51.8 percent--to \$57.4 billion.¹⁸ A higher rate of growth of foreign trade than the growth rate of industry and agriculture is envisaged. The basis of fulfillment of these plans is to be an increase in exports; at the Fifth National People's Congress Fifth Session, which adopted the Sixth Five-Year Plan, Zhao Ziyang said that "an increase in exports is the basis of the development of foreign trade."¹⁹ According to Chinese press reports, a long-term 10-year plan of the production of export commodities is being drawn up. Similar plans are to

be prepared at provincial level and also at the level of enterprises working for export.²⁰ It is contemplated in the very near future concentrating efforts on exports of oil, coal, certain nonferrous metals and other minerals; it is planned expanding exports of products of light and textile industry, electrical engineering and objets d'art. Attention to the sale of Chinese goods on the international market, the creation of a "marketing network" abroad and an improvement in the outward appearance and quality of the commodities is increasing. It is pointed out that particular significance is attached in this connection to the markets of the United States, Latin America, the Near East countries and the oil-producing countries of North Africa. Measures are being adopted to modernize the sectors working for export and servicing foreign trade. For this purpose foreign capital will be attracted to the export sectors and compensation deals will be practiced extensively. Work has begun on modernizing sea ports and the railroads to them.²¹

All these measures, the Chinese leaders believe, should increase exports of Chinese commodities to the foreign market and thereby create the necessary conditions for an expansion of imports. According to the goals of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, imports are to increase at an annual 9.5 percent, with an 8.7 percent increase in turnover; the set task is that of improving the structure of imports and increasing the proportion of imports of new technology and key equipment.²² The Chinese press has called for the avoidance in equipment and technology imports of the mistakes made earlier such as purchases of unduly large batches of equipment, the acquisition of identical equipment in different countries and the importation of obsolete and unreliable models.²³ It is proposed for an improvement in the structure of imports also reducing in the future purchases on the foreign market of such commodities as chemical fibers, fertilizer and toxic chemicals, the need for which is to be covered thanks to internal resources; purchases of certain types of agricultural product, primarily cotton, and also soybeans and soybean oil are to be reduced. It is assumed that grain imports will continue for a long time yet, but a gradual reduction therein in the future is considered desirable.²⁴

China's turn toward the outside world, implementation of the "open foreign economic policy" and the advancement of plans to expand economic relations with other countries have exerted a direct influence on the development of the entire foreign economic complex, primarily foreign trade. There has been a considerable expansion of its geography and scale in this time. In the first half of the 1980's China was maintaining trade-economic relations with 174 countries and territories and had signed intergovernmental trade agreements and protocols with 89 states and international economic organizations, and technical cooperation agreements had been concluded with 70 countries.²⁵ The developed capitalist countries are the PRC's main trading partners. They accounted in 1980 for approximately 60 percent of the country's foreign trade turnover.²⁶ The data of Table 1 attest the development of the PRC's trade exchange with the outside world.

Table 1. PRC Foreign Trade (1970-1984)

Year	Turnover		Exports		Imports		Balance \$, billions
	\$, billions	Increase over preceding year (%)	\$, billions	Increase over preceding year (%)	\$, billions	Increase over preceding year (%)	
1970	4.59	13.9	2.26	2.7	2.33	27.3	-0.7
1971	4.85	6.4	2.61	15.5	2.21	- 5.2	+0.4
1972	6.30	29.9	3.44	31.8	2.86	29.4	+0.58
1973	10.98	74.3	5.82	69.2	5.16	80.4	+0.66
1974	14.57	32.7	6.95	19.4	7.62	47.7	-0.67
1975	14.75	1.2	7.26	4.5	7.49	- 1.7	-0.23
1976	13.44	- 8.9	6.86	- 5.5	6.58	-12.1	+0.28
1977	14.80	10.1	7.59	10.6	7.21	9.6	+0.38
1978	20.64	39.5	9.75	28.5	10.89	51.0	-1.14
1979	29.33	42.1	13.66	40.1	15.67	43.9	-2.01
1980	37.82	28.9	18.27	33.7	19.55	24.8	-1.28
1981	40.37	6.7	20.89	14.3	19.48	- 0.5	+1.41
1982	39.30	- 2.7	21.82	4.5	17.48	-10.3	+4.34
1983	40.73	3.6	22.20	1.7	18.53	6.0	+3.67
1984	49.97	22.7	24.44	10.1	25.53	37.8	-1.09

Sources: "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," Section VIII, p 32; "China Statistical Yearbook 1983," Beijing, 1983, p 420; "China Statistical Survey 1984," Beijing, 1984, p 85; RENMIN RIBAO, 23 January 1985.

These data show that there was a rapid growth of trade exchange in the latter half of the 1970's as a whole. The highest rate pertains to 1978-1980, when the foreign trade turnover grew by a factor of more than 2.5. However, the enlargement of the scale of foreign trade was not balanced. Imports increased considerably faster than exports, particularly in 1978, when in the year imports grew almost 1.8 times faster than exports. As a result the country's foreign trade balance in 1978-1980 was in deficit and altogether amounted to \$4.43 billion. The unfavorable state of the balance of trade was caused by the fact that in endeavoring to speed up the pace of modernization to the maximum China made purchases abroad of major consignments of complete-set equipment. Contracts totaling \$7.8 billion were signed in 1978 alone, whereas equipment costing \$3.36 billion had been acquired abroad in the period 1970-1977, and as a result "the country's technical and financial possibilities were considerably exceeded."²⁷ The PRC had to cancel or slow down a number of contracts which had been signed earlier and reduce equipment imports the following year to \$1.9 billion.²⁸

The difficulties which arose in the development of foreign trade on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's insistently dictated the need for the adoption of energetic measures to overcome them. These measures were a part of the "regulation" of the economy proclaimed in 1979 for the purpose of removing the disproportions in the national economy. In respect of foreign trade the "regulation" meant a concentration of efforts on an improvement in the balance of trade. First of all, strict control over imports, particularly imports of commodities a sufficiency of whose production could be organized within the country, was established. The reduction in purchases thereof was combined with the development of import-substituting works. The need for such a policy is explained in the Chinese press by the need, first, to protect national industry against foreign competition and, second, prevent the growth of the country's dependence on imports.²⁹ Changes occurred in the strategy of purchases abroad of machinery, equipment, industrial raw material and semimanufactures. Whereas in the 1970's the main emphasis had been put on the acquisition of complete-set equipment, now the center of gravity shifted to imports of key equipment for new facilities and the modernization of existing enterprises. Consequently, in the period 1980-1983 the proportion of machinery and equipment in the PRC's imports declined: in 1983 it amounted to 17.6 percent compared with 27.5 percent in 1980.³⁰ Altogether the proportion of producer goods in imports declined to 70.8 percent in 1982 compared with 81.4 percent in 1978.³¹

Thanks to a growth of production within the country, China was able to limit imports of cotton, soybeans and vegetable and animal oil. There was a particularly pronounced decline in purchases of cotton: whereas in 1980 China had acquired abroad 897,6000 tons, in 1983 it acquired 132,600 tons. Grain imports remained roughly at the level of 1980, when the country imported 13.43 million tons of cereals (13.44 million tons in 1983, but approximately 10.65 million tons in 1984).³⁴ China succeeded to a certain extent in halting the trend toward a rapid increase in grain imports which had been observed in the latter half of the 1970's.

The measures to control imports led to a decline therein in 1981-1982, which was particularly pronounced in 1982, when imports declined 10 percent. In 1983 the restrictions on imports were relaxed, as a consequence of which they grew more rapidly than exports. In 1984 the growth rate of imports was more than three times higher than exports, as a result of which a deficit balance of the order of \$1.09 billion took shape once again. In this first half of 1985 this trend continued. According to data of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, in the first 6 months of 1985 imports increased 70.4 percent compared with the same period of the preceding year and amounted to \$14.42 billion. Exports, on the other hand, declined 1.3 percent and amounted to \$11.26 billion. Thus the deficit balance in the first half of 1985 was in excess of \$3 billion.³³ The emergence of the deficit in foreign trade turnover was caused to a considerable extent, we believe, by the appreciable increase in 1983-1984 in machinery and equipment purchases on foreign markets. Whereas in 1982, according to data of the Main Customs

Administration, the PRC imported machinery and equipment totaling 5.94 billion yuan, in 1983 and 1984 the amounts were 7.86 billion and 16.8 billion yuan respectively.³⁴

An important place in the efforts to regulate the balance of trade was assigned the growth of exports of Chinese commodities to foreign markets and a strengthening of the export sectors. By the end of 1982 the country had 24 comprehensive facilities for the production of export products, 94 special plants working for the export market and 90 depots producing agricultural products. This capacity produces 22 percent of the PRC's total export goods.³⁵ The extensive attraction of foreign capital and the development of such forms of cooperation therewith as compensation trade and commission processing and assembly are planned to speed up the modernization of the sectors connected with foreign trade. These forms are most prevalent in the coastal cities. Thus in 1981 in Shanghai products which underwent commission assembly constituted 54 percent of export commodities produced in this city, in Tianjin, 50 percent.³⁶ This set of measures contributed to the fact that the stable growth of exports was generally ensured at the start of the 1980's. In 1980-1982 its growth rate was higher than the rate of increase in imports. In 1984 Chinese commodities totaling \$24.44 billion were sold on the foreign market--the biggest indicator in PRC history. As a result the PRC's share of world exports in 1983 equaled 1.23 percent compared with 0.75 percent in 1978, and the PRC moved from 32d to 16th place on the list of the biggest exporter-countries.³⁷

At the same time there have been no fundamental changes in the export structure. Minerals such as oil and nonferrous metals constitute the bulk thereof, as before. In 1983-1984 exports of oil were in excess of 20 million tons, and altogether primary products constituted 45.6 percent of the country's exports in 1984.³⁸ The proportion of engineering products remains negligible. Thus the problem of an expansion of exports and bringing their commodity structure into line with the needs of the international market by way of an increase in the proportion of finished articles and engineering products remains in the 1980's also a most urgent problem of the development of the PRC's foreign trade.

Efforts to improve the commodity structure and eliminate the deficit balance are being underpinned by measures to transform the system of management of As a whole China scored certain successes in foreign trade in the first half of the 1980's, primarily in righting the imbalance in trade turnover. In 1981-1983 the annual turnover resulted in a surplus balance, which amounted to \$9.42 billion altogether. The improvement in the state of the balance of foreign trade. These transformations were initiated by the 11th CCP Central Committee Third Plenum (1978), which set the task of overcoming inordinate centralization, production's separation from marketing, financial leveling and low efficiency.³⁹ The rights of the sectors and enterprises servicing foreign trade were broadened to this end at the start of the 1980's; they were set the task of becoming "relative independent economic units which

could correspond to changes in the market."⁴⁰ A number of cities and provinces were accorded special rights in conducting foreign trade transactions. The first to acquire them were the coastal provinces Guangdong and Fujian. They, in particular, were authorized to export to the foreign market the commodities produced therein, except for oil and petroleum products, trade in which remained the prerogative of the central authorities. "General foreign trade companies" were formed in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. The broadening of the rights of other coastal provinces and cities began as of 1982.⁴¹ However, these reforms have not as yet justified the hopes placed in them. As PRC State Council Vice Premier Tian Jiyun observed at the All-China Work Conference on Foreign Economic Relations and Foreign Trade in November 1984, "there are many shortcomings which are fettering the development of foreign trade."⁴²

As a whole China scored certain successes in foreign trade in the first half of the 1980's, primarily in righting the imbalance in trade turnover. In 1981-1983 the annual turnover resulted in a surplus balance, which amounted to \$9.42 billion altogether. The improvement in the state of the balance of trade contributed to positive changes in the balance of payments and an increase in the country's foreign currency reserves. According to the data of Chinese statistics at the end of 1983, they were in excess of \$13.34 billion.⁴³ According to World Bank data, China was in seventh place in the world in terms of gold and currency reserves.⁴⁴ This, in turn, strengthened confidence in the PRC's solvency on the part of its trading partners among the developed capitalist countries. Indirect confirmation of this is the fact that in 1983-1984 China was one of the biggest recipients of loans via World Bank channels, it being granted loans totaling \$1 billion, which puts the PRC in third place after India and Brazil, which received \$2.7 and \$1.5 billion respectively. Experts' forecasts testify that by 1990 the sum total of credit to China could increase to \$2.7-4.6 billion (in 1980 prices).⁴⁵

Many difficulties and problems remain together with these successes on the path of development of the PRC's foreign trade.

First, there are difficulties of an objective nature. Their influence on the PRC's foreign trade will inevitably be prolonged in view of the existence of "bottlenecks" in the country's economy. According to acknowledgments of the Chinese press, the development of foreign trade is being slowed by "backward technology and equipment," "inadequate exploitation of mineral stocks" and "lack of financial resources".⁴⁶

Second, there are serious shortcomings in the commodity structure of exports and imports and in the system of management of foreign trade. To overcome them it is planned conducting as of 1985 a reform of the "structure of foreign trade".

It is as yet difficult to speak at the present time about the details of the planned reform, but, to judge by Chinese press material and the published information on the report of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on reform of the structure of foreign trade approved by the PRC State Council, it may be assumed that the PRC sees as the main path for a solution of structural problems a further decentralization of the system of management of foreign trade. It is planned broadening the rights of the enterprises working for export in the choice of product selection and price-forming and introducing more extensively cost accounting in foreign trade companies under the jurisdiction of both the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and other ministries. The central authorities are assigned the role of coordinators of sorts "viewing the overall situation," "advancing the main business" and so forth. The Chinese press notes that "the transformation will be effected gradually."⁴⁷

Third, the PRC's economic relations with foreign countries are influenced by the situation on the world capitalist commercial and currency markets. The growth of protectionism in the developed capitalist countries, the high discount rates and the sharp fluctuations in the currency exchange rates are being reflected negatively in the development of the PRC's foreign trade. These difficulties are to a considerable extent the result of the country's previous one-sided orientation toward the world capitalist market to the detriment of mutually profitable, stable relations with the socialist countries. It should be noted that a trend toward a gradual revitalization of these relations has emerged in recent years.

Thus a constant growth of Soviet-Chinese trade has been observed as of 1981. Whereas in 1981 bilateral trade turnover was R176.8 million, in 1984 it had risen to R977.8 million.⁴⁸ A big contribution to the development of mutually profitable Soviet-Chinese economic relations was made by the visits of I.V. Arkhipov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the PRC and of PRC State Council Vice Premier Yao Yilin to the USSR in December 1984 and July 1985 respectively. During I.V. Arkhipov's visit to the PRC both sides exchanged opinions on questions of trade-economic and S&T cooperation between the two countries and agreed to sign a long-term agreement on commodity turnover and payments for 1986-1990.⁴⁹ During the negotiations in Moscow the Soviet side emphasized the USSR's endeavor to improve and develop Soviet-Chinese relations and economic and cultural relations on a mutually acceptable and equal basis in the interests of the peoples of the two countries and the cause of peace worldwide.⁵⁰ I.V. Arkhipov and Yao Yilin signed an agreement between the USSR and PRC governments on commodity turnover and payments for 1986-1990 and an agreement on economic and technical cooperation in the construction and modernization of PRC industrial facilities.

These documents envisage an annual expansion of reciprocal commodity supplies in the period up to 1990 and determine the industrial and other facilities of the PRC in whose modernization and construction the Soviet Union will participate. In accordance with the agreement on commodity turnover and payments, the USSR will supply China with machinery, equipment, means of transport and raw material, construction and chemical goods. Agricultural and industrial raw material and consumer goods will be supplied from the PRC. Reciprocal trade in the period 1986-1990 is to increase considerably and will amount to approximately R12 billion, and in 1990, R3 billion. Cooperation in the construction of 7 new facilities and the modernization of 17 facilities in such sectors as power engineering, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, machine building, coal industry, chemical industry, transport and others is envisaged.⁵¹

Positive changes are occurring in the PRC's trade-economic relations with the other socialist countries. There has been a marked expansion in recent years in China's trade relations with Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the CSSR and Yugoslavia. Economic cooperation with the DPRK and Romania has been of a traditionally active nature. The expansion of the PRC's equal long-term trade-economic relations with the socialist countries represents important potential for the healthy and stable development of China's foreign trade.

Evaluating the appreciable changes which occurred in the PRC's foreign trade policy on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's, it may be stated that in this period the country carried out a significant revision of the priorities of development strategy in the direction of increased attention to the role of its foreign trade in the development of the economy.

The summary data on the movement of foreign trade adduced in Table 2 testify that its role in the development of the PRC's national economy is, albeit slowly, growing. At the same time, however, in terms of the indicators recorded in the table China lags behind the industrially developed countries considerably. As a whole the PRC economy continues to be predominantly of an exclusive nature. The country is as yet insufficiently involved in the international division of labor, which is having a negative effect on the efficiency of the entire national economic complex.

As a whole the PRC's foreign trade entered a new stage of its development as of the end of the 1970's, which has been characterized by the increased scale and long-term nature of economic relations with the outside world. For the first time following a long interval the elaboration of a long-term strategy of the use of external factors in economic development, which is now being implemented in the form of an "open foreign economic policy," has been resumed. This strategy has not yet assumed final outline, and possible changes both within the country and on the international market could make appreciable adjustments to it.

Table 2. Role of Foreign Trade in PRC Economy

	1957	1965	1978	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
GSP* (yuan, billions)	160.6	269.5	684.6	849.6	904.8	989.4	1105.2	1283.5
Imports (yuan, billions)	5.0	5.5	18.7	29.9	34.6	33.6	36.3	57.1
Imports' share of GSP (%)	3.1	2.0	2.7	3.5	3.8	3.4	3.3	4.6
Gross value of industrial and agricultural product (yuan, billions)	124.1	223.5	563.4	663.8	758.0	829.1	920.9	1062.7
Exports (yuan, billions)	5.45	6.3	16.8	27.1	37.1	42.0	43.4	54.9
Exports' share of industrial and agri- cultural product (%)	4.4	2.8	2.9	4.1	4.9	5.1	4.7	5.2

Sources: "China Economic Yearbook. 1983," section III, p 2; "China Encyclopedic Yearbook. 1984," p 251; RENMIN RIBAO, 10 March 1985.

* GSP = gross social product; all value indicators are given in current prices.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "The PRC Economy: Transport, Trade, Finances (1949-1975)," Moscow, 1979, p 159.
2. L.V. Filatov, "Economic Evaluation of the Soviet Union's S&T Assistance to China. 1949-1966," Moscow, 1980, p 47.
3. I. Alekseyev, F. Nikolayev, "Certain Trends in PRC Policy," MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No 11, 1984, p 29.
4. Quoted from O.B. Borisov, B.T. Koloskov, "Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1945-1980," Moscow, 1980, p 175.
5. "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," Beijing, 1982, section VIII, p 32.
6. "Structure of China's Economy" (abridged translation from the Chinese), Moscow, 1984, p 18.
7. "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," section VIII, p 32.

8. See Z.V. Dashkevich, "The PRC's Foreign Economic Relations," PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA No 4, 1982, p 28.
9. "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," section VIII, p 32.
10. "Structure of China's Economy," p 46.
11. BEIJING REVIEW, 31 May 1982, p 13.
12. "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," section II, p 16.
13. The Chinese term "duiwai kaifang zhengqie" is interpreted dissimilarly by different authors. The following translation variants are encountered, in the main: "open policy in the sphere of foreign economic relations" and "open doors policy". It would seem, however, that use in this case of the term "open doors policy" is not entirely legitimate. This expression gives rise to associations with the "open doors" doctrine formulated by American diplomacy in 1898, the essence of which consisted of the demand that all the imperialist powers (that is, the United States primarily) be accorded equal rights for economic expansion in China. Currently the sense of this term as it is understood in the PRC is that the country has abandoned economic isolation and turned to face the rest of the world.
14. RENMIN RIBAO, 8 September 1982.
15. RENMIN RIBAO, 16 May 1984.
16. RENMIN RIBAO, 21 October 1984.
17. GUOJI MAOYI No 4, 1983, p 4.
18. "China Economic Yearbook. 1983," section II, p 109.
19. Ibid., p 57.
20. CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE No 4, 1982, p 13.
21. RENMIN RIBAO, 20 September 1982, 4 January 1983 and others; "China Economic Yearbook. 1983," section II, pp 57-59; CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE No 3, 1982, p 6.
22. "China Economic Yearbook. 1983," section II, p 57.
23. BEIJING REVIEW, 31 May 1982, p 15.
24. GUOJI MAOYI, No 3, 1983, pp 14-15.

25. "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," section V, p 280; RENMIN RIBAO, 4 January 1983.
26. "The PRC in 1980: Politics, Economics, Ideology," Moscow, 1984, p 114.
27. "China Economic Yearbook. 1981," section IV, p 131.
28. Ibid.
29. GUOJI MAOYI No 3, 1983, p 13.
30. "China Foreign Trade Yearbook. 1984," Beijing, 1984, section IV, p 10.
31. "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," section V, p 278; "China Statistical Yearbook. 1983," p 415.
32. "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," section VII, p 53; HONGQI No 22, 1984, p 39.
33. RENMIN RIBAO, 25 July 1985.
34. "China: A Statistics Survey in 1985," Beijing, 1985, p 90.
35. "China Economic Yearbook. 1983," section IV, p 131.
36. "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," section V, p 279.
37. "China Encyclopedic Yearbook. 1984," Beijing, 1984, p 403.
38. HONGQI No 22, 1984, p 39; RENMIN RIBAO, 10 March 1985.
39. "China Economic Yearbook. 1982," section V, p 280.
40. Ibid., p 281.
41. Ibid.
42. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 September 1984.
43. "China Statistical Survey. 1984," Beijing, 1984, p 76.
44. CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW No 1, 1984, p 36.
45. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 27 September 1984, p 97.
46. BEIJING REVIEW, 31 May 1982, p 14.
47. RENMIN RIBAO, 20 September, 1 November 1984.

48. "USSR Foreign Trade in 1981. Statistical Digest," Moscow, 1982 pp 215-217.

49. PRAVDA, 24 December 1984.

50. PRAVDA, 12 July 1985.

51. PRAVDA, 11 July 1985.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1986

8850

CSO: 1807/385

ULYANOVSKIY ON PAST, PRESENT OF INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 86 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 47-53

[Article by R.A. Ulyanovskiy: "The Indian Communist Party--Party of Patriots and Internationalists"]

[Text] The formation of the Indian Communist Party [CPI] as a result of the unification of groups of Indian revolutionaries inspired by the teaching of Marxism-Leninism was of historic significance not only for India and its people's struggle for independence but also for the international communist movement. A vanguard of the working class had taken shape in a great Asian country which had given the world one of the most ancient civilizations and which for centuries had languished under the oppression of foreign conquerors and become the principal element in the colonial system of British imperialism. Was this not convincing confirmation of the general nature and very great vital force of the ideas of scientific socialism and their capacity for being the foundation of a creative analysis of the situation and a means of mobilizing consistently revolutionary forces. The difficult and heroism-filled search for a path led India's revolutionaries to the teaching of Marx--Engels--Lenin.

Concerned at the growth of the consciousness of the working class, which promised an intensification of the anti-imperialist struggle, reactionary forces both in India and in the metropolis endeavored to discredit the young party and declared it to be an alien phenomenon for India and the fruit of outside interference. A well-known method, to which imperialists have resorted repeatedly against all fighters for the freedom of the peoples. Even Mahatma Gandhi, the very embodiment of national sources and traditions, was accused by the British press in the most revolutionary period of his anti-imperialist activity--during the first national satyagraha (civil disobedience) (sic) campaign--of having his actions directed from Moscow. The "hand of Moscow" and the "specter of the Comintern" invariably figure throughout the history of the CPI in the hostile domestic and foreign propaganda endeavoring to weaken and undermine the positions of the communists in India.

The CPI has never concealed the fact that it is a part of the international communist movement, is guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism and sees the rapprochement of the working people of all countries as the guarantee of success in the struggle for national independence, democracy, socioeconomic progress and the end of man's exploitation of man. But together with this the CPI has always been and remains primarily a national party and consistently revolutionary national force championing the interests of hundreds of millions of Indian workers.

British domination in India made the main direction of the national movement struggle against colonialism. It was in the channel of this struggle that the CPI, which was called on to make its contribution to the accomplishment of the most important tasks confronting the nation, arose.

It was no accident that the CPI was formed precisely in 1925. Following the tempestuous upsurge in 1919-1922, the national liberation movement was undergoing a falling-off period. Many patriots were experiencing profound disappointment and seeking a way out of the situation. M. Gandhi and the leadership of the oldest nationalist organization, the Indian National Congress [INC], had been unable to offer a satisfactory solution. There was an acute sense of need for new ideas and methods and revolutionary resolve. The creation of the CPI was the response to this situation. Its first goal was winning full national independence. A stimulus to the formation of the party was the aspiration to raise the national liberation struggle to a higher level and impart new impetus to it.

India's communists proceeded not only from the requirements of national life but also from an analysis of national experience. On the one hand the crisis of the national movement had demonstrated the narrowness of the bourgeois leadership of the INC and the inconsistency of M. Gandhi, who had suspended at his own initiative the extensive popular protest campaign for fear that it might get out of his control and develop into a violent struggle against the colonizers. It was clear that what was needed was a strengthening of the social base of the anticolonial movement and an enhancement of the role therein of the workers and peasants the least inclined to compromise and that it was essential for the continuation of active struggle to put pressure on the INC leaders. On the other, the founders of the CPI soberly and critically evaluated their own past and also the experience of the activity of the Indian revolutionaries and nationalist radicals outside of the INC. Prior to the creation of the CPI, many Indian communists had experienced the stage of heroic, but fruitless terrorist struggle against the colonial administration. Forced into exile, they attempted the first time to continue the struggle by the old methods, absolutizing violence and counting on conspiracy. Revolutionary anti-imperialist nationalism led many Indian patriots to the communist movement, however. But this was connected with the qualitative changes in their consciousness and activity. They were persuaded of the futility of terror, of the unwarranted nature of the principle only of armed struggle and of the need for assimilation of the theory of scientific socialism, the mobilization and organization of the masses and the creation of a strong social base of revolutionary activity. Two series of phenomena

which developed within the framework of the liberation movement--the crisis of the moderate, centrist, basically national-bourgeois leadership of the INC and the bankruptcy of individualist, terrorist radical nationalism--prepared the ground for the creation in precisely this period of a Marxist-Leninist party.

The CPI emerged in a country which, as V.I. Lenin put it, was in the 20th century experiencing a bourgeois revolution,* in a colonial country where the first step of this revolution was to have been the winning of national sovereignty. Like other communist parties which arose in the colonies, the CPI had for the first time in the history of the revolutionary movement to tackle tasks of exceptional complexity. How to combine class and national goals, fidelity to the ideals of internationalism and a readiness to participate in practice in tackling the immediate tasks of the national, democratic movement? How to propagandize communism in a country where class relations were enmeshed in caste, communal, religious and tribal ties and prejudices, where the industrial proletariat constituted a negligible part of the population and as a whole had not acquired a consistent class consciousness, where the peasantry--oppressed by feudal lords and usurers and plundered by British finance capital--constituted the overwhelming majority of the population, where influential positions were occupied by a broad and diverse petty bourgeois stratum and where national capital was distinguished by great political experience and was making skillful use of the contradictions with imperialism for glossing over internal class antagonisms and preaching national unity--under its hegemony in a national movement and given the working people's renunciation of struggle for their class goals? A most important aspect of the problems confronting the communists was the formulation of a correct attitude toward the political schools and parties which existed in the country, primarily toward the oldest and most authoritative nationalist organization--the INC. The INC was connected with national capital and with the Indian bourgeoisie, which was strengthening despite the unfavorable conditions of the colonial regime. But in order to head the mass liberation struggle against British rule of India the INC had advanced a national goal--the winning of independence. There were in its milieu leaders who had won by their disinterested activity and selflessness the trust of the masses and who were able to transcend the narrow interests of Indian business circles, which were frequently disposed to class collaboration with the British colonizers. This imparted great mass strength to the INC.

Two versions of a solution of the most complex question of the place of the Communist Party in the national liberation movement and its strategy were discussed.

The first solution proceeded from the new promising trends in the Indian liberation movement, from Indian revolutionaries' turn toward Marxism-Leninism, a thorough scientific analysis of national conditions and consideration of the experience of the international communist movement. This was the

* V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 22, p 120.

line which V.I. Lenin theoretically substantiated and firmly upheld at the Second Comintern Congress, particularly in the polemic with Indian representative M.N. Roy, the line aimed at the creation and strengthening of a united anti-imperialist front. While protecting the organizational and ideological-political independence of the communists as their major gain this strategy amounted at the same time to cooperation with bourgeois and petty bourgeois national-revolutionary movements for the purpose of joint struggle against British colonialism. Posing the problem of the hegemony of the working class and the leadership of the communists in the national liberation movement was at that time, as V.I. Lenin showed to the few Indian communists, unrealistic. The task was to establish an alliance of all working people in joint struggle with all anti-imperialist forces against colonialism, the monopolies and reaction--for national independence and for the removal of the British raj (rule). Only in the course of such a struggle, in line with the increase in their actual contribution to the common cause and the strengthening of organization and cohesion, could the working class and the communists gain recognition as the most dependable and, with the passage of time, leading force of the liberation movement.

The second solution was evoked to a considerable extent by the past of the Indian communists who joined the party from terrorist groups, not having fully overcome their ideological and tactical heritage. M.N. Roy was its best-known propagandist. He insisted that the communists must from the very outset "capture" the leadership of the national struggle and that it must be switched as soon as possible to the tracks of socialist revolution and claimed that the national bourgeois and even petty bourgeois political schools were incapable of any in any way consistent struggle against imperialism. Granted all the good intentions of the supporters of this course, it was of a reckless nature and represented a striking manifestation of "leftwing communism--an infantile disorder" in the communist and national liberation movement.

Indian communists approved the Leninist action platform, but rudiments of and relapses into leftism made themselves felt for a long time and were periodically revived at different stages of the history of the CPI. It may be claimed with confidence that India's communists are obliged for all their achievements and their authority among the working masses to the pursuit of a policy of a united anti-imperialist front and the surmounting of sectarian, isolationist delusions, which frequently complicated the expansion of the CPI's social base since many workers and peasants believed, not without reason, in the honest anti-imperialism of M. Gandhi and J. Nehru and trusted the INC.

Back in the 1920's the communists developed via the periodical press propaganda of the ideals of scientific socialism and Marxist-Leninist ideas concerning the essence and tasks of the liberation movement. They endeavored to overcome the class-conditioned and limited Congressist tactics of a "pure" liberation movement excluding independent protests of the working people with their own social demands. The communists considered it necessary to combine the mass Gandhian campaigns--civil disobedience and noncooperation--with the

strike movement and peasant antifeudal protests. The CPI scored many successes in mobilizing the working masses. Its activists set up peasant alliances (Kisan sabha) and militant trade unions and organized such powerful protests of the proletariat as the months-long strikes of the Bombay textile workers (1933 and 1938) and won a leading position in the All-India Congress of Trade Unions.

The growth of the communists' influence evoked the alarm and hatred of the British administration. Prior to the creation of the CPI, in 1924, a provocative trial concerning a "Bolshevik conspiracy" in Kanpur had been organized. An anticommunist trial in Meerut, which lasted 4 years, began in 1929. Dozens of communists ended up in prison. They used the court as a platform for proclamation and propaganda of their views. The fate of the Meerut prisoners attracted general attention in India. M. Nehru, veteran of the liberation movement, spoke in their defense. Mahatma Gandhi visited them in prison. The harsh persecution did not break the will of the communists.

Relying on a strong base in the expanding worker and peasant movement, as of the mid-1930's the CPI struggled purposefully to strengthen the united anti-imperialist front. In 1933 the Indian communists advocated broadening of cooperation with other parties in the trade union organizations. A decision was adopted in 1936 on the entry of the communists into the INC. Many members of the CPI joined the Congress Socialist Party. This gave them a chance to expand their influence and have a direct impact on INC policy. By 1939 the INC central body--the All-India Congress Committee--included 20 communists. The successes of the CPI, whose authority among the left wing of the INC had grown markedly, gave rise to the dissatisfaction and suspicion of a number of Congress supporters. The leadership of the Congress Socialist Party issued a statement on the "subversive activity" of the communists, and a rightwing leader of the socialists, M. Masani, put out in 1938 the brochure "The Communist Conspiracy Against the Congress Socialist Party". It was part of the anticommunist campaign unleashed by circles of the right.

WWII put all directions of the Indian liberation movement in a difficult position. The struggle against fascism created for the British Government a certain aura in the eyes of the public, particularly following Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR, which changed the nature of the war. When the INC, following long hesitation, announced a campaign of noncooperation, the government quickly smashed it by a clampdown. Thrown in jail, the leading personnel of the INC were for a long time divorced from active political life at the critical moment of the approach of independence. Under these conditions there was a recrudescence of community-communalist reaction encouraged by the colonialists.

Guided by its international duty, the CPI adhered to positions of support for the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition, primarily the Soviet Union, and refused to take part in the noncooperation. But this led to a certain estrangement of the party from the national forces. This estrangement increased after the war. Many nationalist leaders slighted the communists without any grounds whatever, unwilling to understand their internationalist

position during WWII. Attempts to establish cooperation with the INC were unsuccessful. The communists quit the Congress. An atmosphere was created which contributed to a relapse into a policy of severance of ties to the national movement.

The peasant movement and the uprising which had taken place in Telegan, with the active participation of the communists, against the tyrannical regime of the Nizam of Hyderabad, the owner of a large feudal principality, against manorial landowning and for self-determination of the Telugu people had great repercussions and attested the considerable authority of the CPI. Prime Minister J. Nehru had to recognize the nobility of the motives of the insurgents and the justice of their demands. But under the most difficult conditions which the country was experiencing at the end of the 1940's this action was viewed as disloyal in respect of the national government and was made extensive use of by the CPI's enemies to isolate it.

After India had won political independence, left-sectarian sentiments emerged in the ranks of the Communist Party. Some of its leaders claimed that the Indian bourgeoisie and the INC, which represented its interests, had completely exhausted their anti-imperialist potential and had switched to the camp of imperialism and that, consequently, the task of the communists and all forces of the left of India was to fight to oust the Nehru government and establish worker-peasant power. This fallacious line was imposed on the Communist Party by the left-sectarian elements which prevailed at its second congress in 1948.

However, the nucleus of the party remained loyal to the time-tested traditions of the united anti-imperialist front and led to a struggle to overcome one-sided pseudorevolutionary ideas. An outstanding role in the restoration of Leninist ideas and in their creative development and specification with respect to India's conditions was performed by Ajai Ghosh, who was elected CPI general secretary in 1951. In the CPI's program documents adopted in 1951 and 1954 the characterization of the national bourgeoisie as a reactionary force tying its fate to imperialism was removed. However, elements of sectarianism in these documents remained. Only the changes made to the program in April 1956 clearly determined the dual political role of Indian capital. Without making light of its proclivity for compromise with the British colonizers, the CPI emphasized the existence of an objective basis of the national bourgeoisie's contradictions with imperialism. These were the continuing imperialist economic exploitation, encroachments on the country's sovereignty and imperialism's alliance with domestic communal and feudal reaction. The actions of the imperialists were impeding the country's economic development, creating obstacles to the growth of national capital and jeopardizing political stability.

The new analysis of the situation brought about the need for substantiation of a differentiated approach to the bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties, primarily the INC, the use of all opportunities of the democratic movement, consolidation of the united patriotic anti-imperialist front and development on this basis of the initiative of the communists and an enhancement of their

role. A strengthening of the party structure and ideological-political independence and the conversion of the CPI into a mass and militant organization of the working class capable of leading all working people were most important tasks.

Having rejected sectarianism and leftism, the CPI also displayed vigilance toward rightwing opportunism, parliamentary illusions and attempts to turn the party into an appendage of the bourgeois political system. The party had no intention of reducing its activity to a struggle for seats in parliament, parliamentary criticism or the support of state authority. Its strength consisted of reliance on the mass movement of workers, peasants, the democratic intelligentsia, petty businessmen and white-collars workers. Work with them and defense of their interests by methods characteristic of the working people--by way of agitation, demonstrations, strikes and so forth--was what was most important in party activity. The CPI's contribution to the national cause and the authority of its voice in the country's representative institutions depended on the strength of its ties to the masses.

As in the years of the struggle for independence, a most important aspect of the united front problem was the attitude toward the INC. This problem was convincingly resolved in CPI documents and in speeches of A. Ghosh. "The INC Party," A. Ghosh said at the Sixth CPI Congress (1961), "was and remains an extraordinarily important factor in India's political life. This is not surprising in view of the role which it performed in the struggle for national independence and in the implementation of measures to strengthen independence under Nehru's leadership. The influence of the INC Party... extends to all classes, including broad strata of the working class. We cannot create a national democratic front while ignoring this important real factor of Indian reality."*

A flexible tactical line of support for progressive INC measures corresponding to national interests and criticism from the standpoints of the working class of the actions of the ruling party which corresponded merely to the selfish interests of the exploiter classes was elaborated on the basis of a specification of the program principles. This policy earned the trust of the working people. They saw the CPI as a strict, objective critic of the actual policy of the authorities of that time approaching an evaluation of the course thereof not in prejudiced manner but on the basis of actual results and prepared to cooperate in all undertakings useful for the people and struggle decisively against the aspects of INC policy in which this party was guided solely by benefit of the ruling class. Both in support and in struggle here CPI activity did not boil down to parliamentary debate. The emphasis was put on the organization, mobilization and education of the working class and all working people and the fostering of their class consciousness. The CPI noted the inconsistency of the INC's domestic policy and its concessions to big business and uncovered the antagonisms of Indian society. It counterposed to the development of private-economic capitalism

* A.K. Ghosh, "Articles and Speeches," Moscow, 1962, p 282.

and the formation of monopolies the idea of a noncapitalist path and completion of the national-democratic revolution. This was the policy of a united anti-imperialism front based on an alliance of all the nation's progressive forces and their regrouping within the framework of this alliance by way of an enhancement of the role of the working people, primarily the working class, and its vanguard--the CPI.

The surmounting of the left-sectarian deviation permitted the Communist Party by the mid-1950's even to have strengthened its position in the masses considerably. The CPI scored impressive successes at the 1957 general election and became the country's most influential opposition party. The same year the communists gained victory at the elections in the state of Kerala and formed the government there, which existed for approximately 2 years and, despite the difficult conditions, earned recognition by its honest policy pursued in the interests of the people's masses.

Subsequently, disagreements in the ideological and tactical planes reemerged within the CPI framework and led to a split in the party, which weakened the democratic movement in the country. The nucleus of the party firmly upheld here the fundamental principles advanced in the 1950's--start of the 1960's in the period of A. Ghosh's leadership. These principles retain their significance today also, in the main.

As the CPI leadership believes, a broad democratic front is, as before, essential for India. Of course, its composition and content are changing constantly. The development of capitalism is leading to a polarization of class forces. Reaction is bestirring itself. Monopoly circles are aspiring to political domination. Big capital would like to squeeze out the public sector and is prepared to cooperate with imperialism. Cohesion on a high-minded basis of all forces of the left of the country is essential under these conditions. Their separation was a tragedy for India throughout the long struggle for independence and in subsequent years. Their joint actions have never been so necessary.

But a democratic front would be narrow if it amounted to an alliance merely of revolutionary forces. The country is confronted, as before, and, in a number of cases, with new seriousness by tasks which may be tackled only on the basis of the cohesion of all broad patriotic, democratic, anti-imperialist forces--economic independence and national security, an end to imperialism's interference with the country's domestic life, preservation of India's unity and territorial integrity, struggle against separatism and terrorism and consistent pursuit of a policy of peace, detente and disarmament. A strengthening of friendship and cooperation with the socialist countries, support for the peoples' struggle for freedom and independence and a strengthening of the nonaligned movement on an anti-imperialist basis are exceptionally important. In tackling all these tasks India's democratic forces of the left are called on to make an appreciable contribution. Their cohesion is an obligatory condition of progressive change in the country in the spirit of an enhancement of the role of the working people and their political vanguard.

The CPI has become an important factor of the country's life. It has won recognition as the opposition party firmly championing the interests of the working masses. It has commended itself in the international communist and workers movement by loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism. The CPI's role in the history of India does not end with its immediate activity. It has made its mark on all national life. Progressive and promising ideas and undertakings which were taken up by other participants in the liberation movement and which have now become generally recognized became a part of the great people's consciousness and practice with it and through it.

It was precisely India's communists who with the emergence of the first Marxist groups firmly carried through the decades of the liberation struggle the slogan of the country's total independence, whereas many leaders of other parties repeatedly compromised in this respect. It was precisely India's communists who raised with complete clarity for the first time the social issue and called attention to the historical narrowness of anti-imperialist nationalism. The ideas of social justice, to which J. Nehru introduced the INC, were to a considerable extent indisputably a consequence of the activity and propaganda of the first Indian Marxists. It was the communists who deprived the ideal of social justice of the nature of a pious wish or purely ethical problem and put it on the firm footing of socioeconomic analysis, whence ensue the regularity and inevitability of social struggle both in the years of the fight against colonialism and under the conditions of national independence. While paying tribute to the broad possibilities of nonviolent tactics of political struggle the communists upheld the right of the oppressed to use force when the colonizers had closed off all other possibilities of resistance and were in all instances supporters of truly popular methods of struggle. They enriched India's liberation movement with the practice of the general strike and mass peasant struggle against feudalism from class standpoints.

India's communists were pioneers in recognition of the international conditions of the Indian people's struggle for independence and in addressing the idea of an alliance with the international workers and democratic movement, with the world's first socialist country and with the socialist community. Imperialist propaganda usually portrayed and continues to portray this as a communist conspiracy, but history has utterly confounded these lying assertions. It is a question of international solidarity not only with the CPI and the Indian people's struggle for independence. The idea of an alliance with the revolutionary forces on the international scene and with the USSR was taken up by J. Nehru, first as leader of the left wing of the INC and later as first prime minister of India. The first steps taken by the Indian national-revolutionaries prior to the formation of the CPI led to a truly nationwide movement for friendship and cooperation between India and the Soviet Union--an important factor of international peace.

The 13th CPI Congress was held this March. The congress took place in an atmosphere characterized by extreme complexity and seriousness, when imperialism is increasing its attempts to interfere in the country's domestic life,

and reactionary forces in India itself are by their active operations putting in jeopardy the country's continued unity and territorial integrity. The unity and cohesion of all truly democratic forces are particularly necessary to put a stop to the dangerous actions of the separatists and terrorists. The split in the Indian anti-imperialist movement is seriously complicating the accomplishment of this task and impeding the establishment of an effective democratic and anti-imperialist front, particularly under conditions where monopoly circles are endeavoring to increase their influence in the country. The congress expressed the idea concerning reunification of the communist movement on the fundamental basis of Marxism-Leninism.

The congress advocated the consistent pursuit of a policy of peace, opposed the arms race and supported a relaxation of international tension and the broad set of peace-loving foreign policy initiatives advanced by the Soviet Union and developed in the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. It was thereby convincingly demonstrated yet again that the CPI is a party of consistent patriots and internationalists.

The CPI is rightly proud of its 60-year history, which has enriched both it and the international communist and workers movement with invaluable experience. The party has known failure and defeat, but it reached manhood in grim struggle together with the working class of its country and has always maintained fidelity to its interests, devotion to the ideals of communism, self-sacrifice and optimism. India's communists resolutely uphold the principles of social justice, national independence, peace, democracy and progress.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1986

8850

CS0: 1807/385

FRANCE'S MILITARY RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN STATES CRITICIZED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 86 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 87-93

[Article by E.G. Georgiyev: "Franco-African Military Relations"]

[Text] Paris sees military cooperation with African countries as a most effective means of preserving its influence on the continent. Particular significance here is attached to the provision of African armed forces with French combat equipment. France has long been known as a major weapons producer. Almost one-third of its military industry works for export. As a seller of arms, France has since 1977 firmly held second place in the capitalist world behind the United States and even surpasses the United States in per capita terms. The developing countries accounted at the end of the 1970's for approximately three-fourths of French military exports.*

French statistics record arms supplies to the area of North Africa and the Near East and the Tropical African countries separately. The relative significance of the first of these regions in France's military exports amounted to 58 percent in 1980, the second, 2.7 percent. But even this 2.7 percent provided the French monopolies with a profit of the order of Fr870 million. The same year France accounted for 98.4 percent of the weapons purchased by Chad, 97 percent by Senegal, 91.1 percent by the Central African Republic, 76.6 percent by Djibouti, 71.6 percent by Rwanda, 68 percent by Zaire, 57.7 percent by the Ivory Coast, 59.9 percent by Togo and 52 percent by Gabon.** For a long time one of the leading places among African consumers of French weapons has been occupied by South Africa.

The victory at the 1981 presidential elections of the union of forces of the left engendered in many people the hope that essential changes would be made to the arms trade. After all, prior to the elections socialist leader F. Mitterrand had declared: "The arms trade will be gradually reoriented. We believe it is necessary to limit arms sales and renounce the use thereof

* "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook," Stockholm, 1981, p 177.

** R. Chaigneau, "La politique militaire de la France en Afrique," Paris, 1984, p 217.

to improve the foreign trade balance."* In 1978 deputies from the Socialist Party had submitted to the National Assembly for examination a bill providing for the establishment of parliamentary control over military exports. However, following the formation of a government of the left, Mauroy, the head thereof, declared that all the commitments which France had assumed earlier in the sphere of arms supplies would be honored. French military industrialists, he gave the assurance, "will remain reliable partners."** Under the new government arms exports not only did not decline but, on the contrary, began to grow at an even faster pace. This was manifested particularly in Africa. In 1981 the relative significance of the Tropical African countries in French arms exports more than doubled (from 2.7 to 5.8 percent); France supplies these countries with Fr2 billion worth of weapons. Justifying the increase in arms supplies, then Defense Minister C. Hernu declared that African countries "are threatened, and France cannot fail to help them strengthen their security."***

Of course, it cannot be denied that a number of purely "African" factors is influencing the growth of military spending on the continent. These are the need to continue the struggle for national independence and defense against invasion by foreign mercenaries, the political instability of certain regimes and the endeavor connected therewith to strengthen their positions with the aid of military force, the unsolved nature of many problems inherited from colonial times and engendering border conflicts and rivalry between countries for a leading role in the region. But in selling the Africans weapons Paris is not concerned with securing for its partners the conditions for secure independent development but is pursuing its own ends.

"The country's security," the journal DEFENSE NATIONALE wrote, "requires that national industry have reliable sources of raw material. France must receive it uninterruptedly, which means preservation of political stability in the supplier-countries and also defense of these countries and their natural resources against the encroachments of potential enemies."****

For the African countries the consequences of the purchase of military equipment abroad and expenditure on maintaining armed forces are highly ruinous. African countries' spending in the years of their independent development has increased (in constant prices) more than 20-fold and in terms of growth rate continues to outpace the growth of the gross domestic product by a factor of almost 1.5.***** Besides the economic damage, weapons imports are also

* LE MONDE, 23 February 1978.

** LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, 18 June 1981.

*** LE MONDE, 11 November 1981.

**** DEFENSE NATIONALE, July 1983, p 21.

***** AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 5, 1984, p 11.

fraught with definite political costs. Although, for example, M. Jobert, former French foreign trade minister, gave the assurance that "in selling arms France has no designs on anyone's liberty,"* everyone understands full well what a strong lever of influence on the countries of the continent arms supplies are. "We are totally dependent on the developed countries," Liberian President W. Tolbert once acknowledged. "Our armies would lose their fighting efficiency completely if they ceased to obtain ammunition and munitions from them."** The armed forces of reactionary African regimes, in equipping which France is directly involved, do not so much provide with the weapons which they have obtained for their countries' external security as serve as an instrument of the suppression of opposition forces and a means of maintaining in power figures closely connected with neocolonialist circles.

Arms exports are not the sole form of France's military cooperation with African states. In the majority of cases the provision of weapons is accompanied by the conclusion of agreements on long-term "military-technical" assistance: the use of French advisers, the training of African servicemen in France's educational institutions and logistic support for African forces are envisaged. Such agreements appeared in the decolonization period, which entailed a cutback in the French military presence on the continent. By the end of the 1950's France had 90 military garrisons here with a troop strength of over 60,000 men. In 1964 the number of garrisons had declined to 40, and the troop strength to 23,000 men. There are approximately 10,000 of them remaining currently.

Forced to withdraw the bulk of its forces from Africa, France hastened to impose military agreements on the former colonies, which were signed mainly in the 1960-1961 period. Some 25 states are currently enlisted in Franco-African military cooperation. There are French military advisers in 20 of them. Half of the French military specialists are involved with the armies, approximately 30 percent are a part of police formations, 17 percent are with the air forces and the remainder are with navies and other arms of the service.*** Their main assignment is "preserving on the continent a status quo favorable to the former metropolis."**** In performing it the French advisers and instructors frequently go beyond the framework of their official functions. As the events in Chad and other countries have shown, the French participate directly in military operations.

Over the years many African states have come to display a desire to rid themselves of France's inordinate tutelage. Paris has been forced to reduce the

* LE MONDE, 11-12 October 1984.

** AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE NO 127, 1983, p 9.

*** A.Bourgi, "La politique francaise de cooperation en Afrique," Paris, 1979, p 188.

**** P. Chaigneau, Op. cit., p 41.

numbers of the military apparatus. Whereas in the 1960's the number of French military advisers was in excess of 3,000, there are now approximately 1,400 of them. Besides advisors, a further 3,500-plus Frenchmen doing their military service in Africa within the framework of the so-called 16-month national service (that is, spent out of the military units) participate in the military cooperation.

Adapting to the new conditions, the French leadership has put the emphasis on the training of African military personnel in France. Whereas in 1963 some 846 persons were trained in this way, 2,630 such were trained in 1981. Over 10,000 Africans underwent training in French military training in institutions in the period 1970-1980 all told.* Paris considers them its reliable support. It is no accident that many of the regimes which are close to France are headed by soldiers who served in the past in French colonial armies or who were educated in France. Expansion of the training of African servicemen in France is, as calculations have shown, profitable from the viewpoint of material outlays: expenditure per military advisor in Africa is the equivalent of the expenditure on the training of seven Africans in France. African countries' attempts to expand the training of military personnel by their own powers receive no support on the part of France. The French explain their position by the fact that modern military equipment requires highly skilled specialists, who can be trained only in France.

In the period of decolonization France handed over to the former colonies a certain quantity of munitions in exchange for their undertaking to have recourse for their maintenance in the proper condition, periodic replacement and provision with the necessary ammunition only to the services of France. Such an undertaking was recorded in the majority of military agreements. Subsequently many African states demanded that they be revised. France was forced to yield. The new wording of the documents allows of the possibility of the African partners turning for weapons to third countries, but only if France cannot satisfy their requirements. This is a negligible concession, of course; as the French expert A. Bourgi rightly observes, "it is a question merely of a change of style, essentially the situation remains unchanged."** Currently the African countries are provided with military equipment predominantly on a commercial basis, and the gratis assistance rendered by France in this sphere occupies a comparatively small place in the overall budget of military cooperation.

Together with the agreements on military-technical assistance France succeeded in the period of decolonization in imposing on a number of African countries joint defense treaties providing for the stationing on their territory of French troops not only for defense against an eternal danger but also

* MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANNEENS No 1937, 24 December 1982, p 3397.

** A. Bourgi, Op. cit., p 186.

for "ensuring internal stability". As Joel (le Tel), speaker of the parliamentary Defense Commission, once acknowledged, some treaties contained secret articles on French guarantees of the personal security of the heads of the "defended" states in the event of "unforeseen circumstances" arising.* Such "commitments" enable France to interfere in these countries' internal affairs.

In the 1970's many former colonies demanded changes in the joint defense treaties. The revised agreements now contain no mention of the possibility of the use of French troops to bring order to bear in a country, but this has not ended the interference in Africans' internal affairs. It is sufficient to recall that France took part in combat operations in Mauritania, twice dispatched its forces to Zaire and has intervened repeatedly in the civil war in Chad, although the military assistance agreements signed with these countries are not joint defense treaties and do not accord the right to the dispatch of French troops. In addition, by the time of the military intervention in Mauritania and Zaire even the agreements on military assistance to them had not been ratified by the French Parliament and, consequently, had no legal force. In justification of France's police actions on the African continent French authorities in the past repeatedly cited the "urgent request of the governments concerned." A similar argument was employed by the French Government at the time of the biggest military invasion of Chad in August 1983--an operation codenamed ("Manta")--the biggest in recent years.

The joint defense treaties permit Paris to maintain a number of military bases affording it an opportunity of intervening promptly in conflict situations both on the continent itself and outside. The African bases have always been for France a "cornerstone of its strategy in world affairs."** It had several dozen such bases in the 1960's. By 1986 French garrisons remained in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Djibouti and Central African Republic. On the basis of the joint defense treaties they enjoy rent-free plots of land and various installations: French servicemen have the right of free movement on the territory of the country and also in its sea and air space, unhindered port calls and the use of airfields and the road and other infrastructure, including all means of communications. Special supplements to the treaties stipulate French soldiers' responsibility for offenses committed in African countries only before a French court. Obviously, the rights accorded the French troops are detrimental to the African states' sovereignty and represent an infringement of their independence.

The French garrisons have been ordered to be in permanent readiness for operations in various parts of Africa and adjacent regions. For this purpose the French subunits are stationed, as a rule, in direct proximity to ports and airfields and provided with the necessary weapons and transport facilities,

* LE MONDE, 31 October 1975.

** P. Chaigneau, Op. cit., p 50.

ammunition and fuel. For example, the military base in Dakar was used as an important starting and transit point for France's military interventions in Gabon and Zaire. French aircraft monitoring the situation in the Western Sahara are based there. In the period of the military conflict over the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands Great Britain, with the permission of the French authorities, used the Dakar base for the transfer of troops to South America. NATO attaches great significance to this base. Considering its strategic location, the World Bank adopted the decision to finance a project named "Maritime Dakar". Western military strategists proceed from the fact that in the event of a nuclear conflict in Europe Dakar is to be the assembly point for 8,000 NATO warships.*

Similar plans are being hatched in respect of Djibouti also, where, Western experts believe, up to 4,000 ships can be deployed in the roads. This military base provides for control over East Africa, the Suez Canal region, part of the Near East and the main oil shipment lanes. France maintains there permanently approximately 4,000 men and also a considerable quantity of aviation and warships. The military bases in Ivory Coast and Gabon are smaller than the Djibouti base in terms of the strength of the garrisons (450 and 500 men respectively) and the degree of equipment, but they also are assigned an important role in preventing a "destabilization" of the situation in the countries under French influence here and providing a springboard for interference in the affairs of other African states.

The significance for France of the Central African Republic has grown considerably in connection with the intervention in Chad. In the period of Operation ("Manta") the capital of the Central African Republic was "the theater of a most impressive operation by the French Army"***--its airport was used to deliver munitions to the French expeditionary corps in Chad.

Together with the French forces stationed in Africa an important role in "detering danger and normalizing the situation" on the African continent is assigned special "rapid intervention forces". The idea of the creation of such a force appeared back in the period of the disintegration of the French colonial empire. "Like any other world power, France," General de Gaulle declared back in November 1961, "cannot remain indifferent to any conflict," it "has to have ground, naval and air intervention forces which can be used at any time and in any place."*** With the appearance of the above-mentioned "force" in the mid-1970's France's military intervention extended even to countries which were not part of its colonial empire. It began in fact to perform in Africa the functions of imperialist gendarme.

* J. Guillemin, "Cooperation et intervention, la politique militaire de la France en Afrique Noire francophone et a Madagascar," Nice, 1979, p 106.

** LE FIGARO, 21 November 1984.

*** C. de Gaulle, "Discoures et messages (1958-1962)," Paris, 1970, p 369.

In April 1977 the French helped Mobutu restore control over Shaba Province.

A year later, in May 1978, they carried out Operation "Leopard" in Zaire. They were concerned primarily here to preserve access to this country's minerals and simultaneously endeavored to protect the interests of the West and prevent a reduction in the sphere of its influence in this region.

Similar considerations dictated France's intervention in Mauritania (1977). Availing itself of the hostage-taking of several Frenchmen in Western Sahara, Paris in fact assumed command of the Mauritanian Armed Forces and rendered the Moroccan regime appreciable support.

In September 1979 troops transferred to Bangui from France and Libreville carried out Operation Barracuda and removed Emperor Bokassa, putting in power in the Central African Republic former president Dacko. The ouster of the regime, which was rotten, but which had for a long time enjoyed Paris' support, was greeted in Africa with approval. At the same time the fact of France's direct interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state was perceived as a manifestation of France's gendarme role and evidence of its endeavor to keep African countries under its influence at any price.

Also indicative in this connection is the history of interventions in Chad. French forces were dispatched there in 1968, 1975, 1978, 1980 and 1986. They participated directly in the struggle against the Chadian National Liberation Front. Leaving the country's territory in 1980 at the demand of the Chadian Government and the OAU, they declared that a French soldier would never again set foot on Chadian soil. But in 1983, under a government of the left, France again engaged in interference of unprecedented scale, dispatching to Chad approximately 4,000 men and a large quantity of combat equipment. The intervention was repeated in February 1986.

The events in Chad have shown that, despite the Socialist Party's election promises to lessen the tutelage over France's African partners and reduce its military presence in Africa, there has been no appreciable change in Franco-African military cooperation. The disturbances in the Zaïrean City of Moba in November 1980 also testify to this. According to THE TIMES, French paratroops took part in suppressing them. And although the French Embassy in Zaire repudiated this information, its spokesman admitted the policy of "French participation in the elaboration of the corresponding operation."*

France's military program for 1984-1988 provides for a further strengthening of the intervention force, which is now called the "quick reaction force". In July 1985 its numbers were increased to 47,000 men. The three existing divisions were reinforced by a further two: an airborne division (6,400 men) with 200 helicopters and an armored division (7,000 men).** This "assault,"

* AFRIQUE DEFENSE No 82, January 1985, p 17.

** JOURNAL OFFICIEL. LOIS ET DECRETS, July 1983, pp 2116-2118.

as a French minister put it, force is officially intended "to prevent crisis situations developing into open conflicts." But it itself represents a serious danger for African countries' independence and territorial integrity and increases the threat of a nuclear war being unleashed inasmuch as there is a possibility of this force being furnished with nuclear weapons. "If the use of strategic nuclear weapons has been ruled out," R. Chaigneau writes, "tactical nuclear weapons, which yesterday even were considered a means of final warning to an aggressor in Europe, are now seen as weapons which could be incorporated in the arsenal of the intervention force."* Such a danger is causing concern even in French political circles. J. Chaumont, speaker of the Senate Defense Commission, evaluated the policy of strengthening the "quick reaction force" as the "adoption of the new American doctrines and abandonment of national deterrence strategy."**

The combat readiness of the troops and "quick reaction force" stationed in Africa is tested at the time of maneuvers, which have been conducted regularly as of the mid-1950's. They are an integral part of Franco-American military cooperation and make it possible to practice with the enlistment of troops of African states various scenarios of the development of a situation. In November-December 1982 some 5,000 French soldiers incorporated in this force, with the support of a naval formation headed by the carrier "Foch" and aircraft, conducted together with Senegalese troops a large-scale training operation in the Dakar region.*** The biggest exercises of subunits of France and Ivory Coast were organized in November 1984. Their purpose was to establish interaction of troops of the two countries to "repulse outside aggression". According to the statement of the Ivory Coast defense minister, it was a question of testing the effectiveness of the joint defense agreement signed with France in 1962.****

Justifying the need for military cooperation with the former colonies, Paris continues to refer to its "historical responsibility" for them and to claim that the young states cannot yet resist an outside threat independently. Nothing is said here, naturally, about the fact that such cooperation permits France to interfere directly in Africa's affairs, maintain military bases there and use them primarily for its own ends.

One such is the preservation in the former colonies of regimes guaranteeing French interests. It is indicative that the amount of French military assistance corresponds directly to the African countries' political orientation. The biggest support is received by states so close to France such as Gabon,

* P.Chaigneau, Op. cit., p 100.

** LE MONDE, 7 December 1984.

*** LE MONDE, 27 November 1982.

**** AFRIQUE DEFENCE No 82, January 1985, p 13.

Djibouti, Zaire, Senegal and the Central African Republic. The presence of French servicemen in African countries deters the activity of opposition forces there. In some countries the French occupy key positions in the national armed forces, which practically precludes the possibility of any major changes without Paris' knowledge and consent.

As French military leaders claim, military cooperation with the African states is essential because France's security is closely connected with Africa: the continent is located close to France, and 260,000 French citizens reside in African countries. In addition, cooperation affords an opportunity for controlling sea lines close to Africa by which raw materials of vital importance to France is delivered. Finally, it needs African ports to inspect, repair and equip its naval forces. African territory serves as an important proving ground for testing new types of French weapons.

France's military cooperation with African countries is a manifestation of neocolonialist policy aimed at keeping the young states in the sphere of capitalism. It does not correspond to the requirements of Africa's independent progressive development. It is this which explains the endeavor, which has been manifested distinctly recently, of many of the countries of the continent to rid themselves of the military agreements imposed on them immediately after they had gained independence.

Africans do not need military tutelage on the part of France and other Western countries, particularly the United States, which is assigning Africa a notable place in realization of the notorious "neoglobalism" concept. The conflicts which are arising on the African continent could certainly be resolved by political means. The attempts to push Africa onto the path of militarism represent the most real danger for it. Its involvement in the arms race is not only seriously impeding the solution of the complex socioeconomic problems confronting African states but also pursues a perfectly definite goal--preventing the completion of the African peoples' national liberation struggle for full independence.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"

Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1986

8850

CSO: 1807/385

ORIENTALIST ASSOCIATION'S CONFERENCE ON MODERN ROLE OF ASIAN TRADITIONS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 86 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 122-123

[News material presented by L.B. Alayev, D.D. Vasilyev, A.N. Kokhlov, G.I. Podpalova, V.G. Savanina, N.L. Grishina, N.V. Yeliseyeva, Yu.M. Ilin]

[Text] A meeting of the All-Union Orientalists Association Presidium, which discussed questions of the organization of study of the historico-cultural traditions of oriental countries and the state of archaeographical work with oriental manuscripts was held on 14 November 1985.

G.F. Kim, deputy chairman of the All-Union Orientalists Association and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, observed that study of cultural-religious traditions and their modern role and the development of culturology as a special scientific field are becoming a highly topical and important task. Soviet orientalists are late with the development of this field, yet in the West applied and theoretical studies of non-European cultures is already quite extensively developed.

The paper "The State of Study in the USSR of the History and Ideology of Medieval Islam," which was prepared by M.B. Piotrovskiy and S.M. Prozorov (USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Institute Leningrad Department), collated the experience of coordination of Islamic-study research since the First All-Union Islamic Studies conference (Tashkent, 1980). In the past 5 years fundamental works on problems of the origins of Islam, Islamic sectarianism and the political and cultural role of Islam have been written. A number of works combines study of medieval Islam with an examination of present-day problems. An all-union plan for the publication and study of manuscripts on Islam is being implemented.

The main task should be coordination of efforts for a solution of urgent and fundamental problems of the history and ideology of Islam. Cooperation on a countrywide scale must be dynamic, taking into consideration the possibilities and specific interests of each oriental studies center. The following fields and subjects could be developed the most effectively in Soviet Islamic studies currently: 1) publication and study of sources pertaining to the history and ideology of Islam; 2) fundamental research connected with questions of the origins of Islam, Muslim culture, the problem of authority in

Islam and religious-political movements, with Sufism as a form of Islam, with study of the vocabulary and the preparation of a scientific-analytical translation of the Koran; 3) summary research: dictionaries, aids and textbooks presenting to the reader at large the latest results of Islamic-study research.

L.S. Vasilyev (Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute) delivered the paper "Chinese Cultural Traditions and the Present Day". He emphasized the topicality of the study of Asian cultural and political traditions. In L.S. Vasilyev's opinion, in the precolonial Orient ideological and political phenomena and institutions were closely connected with the economy and also performed economic functions. For this reason they were frequently of more importance for the functioning of society than factors which we are accustomed to call economic. In particular, great significance for an understanding of present-day China is attached to factors of traditional political culture.

G.M. Bongard-Levin (Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute), corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, noted the topicality of the study of Indian culture, particularly Buddhism and Hinduism, in connection with their growing role in the politics of South and Southeast Asian countries. Interest in traditional Indian culture is growing constantly. It sometimes assumes distorted forms of the spread of surrogates of the Yoga system or surrogates of neo-Hindu cults. Yet these negative phenomena could largely be averted by the publication of interesting and truly scientific popular literature on the same Yoga, Hinduism, Buddhism and so forth. Atheistic propaganda may be conducted successfully only on a basis of profound knowledge of the essence of this religion or the other.

Recalling that study of the historico-cultural traditions of the East is a principal field of the department's work, Yu.A. Petrosyan, head of the Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute Leningrad Department, emphasized that this field is organically inscribed in the institute's research plans pertaining to study of the present day.

Sh.B. Chimitdorzhiev described the problems being encountered by scholars in the USSR Academy of Sciences Buryat Branch Social Sciences Institute. A number of valuable publications in the "Monuments and Sources on the History and Culture of Buryatia, Mongolia and Tibet" and "Structural and Sociological Analysis of the Historical Forms of the Religions of the Siberian Peoples" series has been released. However, the institute lacks an Arabist, Turkic scholar and Sanskrit specialist, as a result of which many valuable manuscripts are not being used. It is essential with the association's assistance to organize the joint work of the orientologists of Buryatia and the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute. For coordination work in this sphere it is necessary to create in Leningrad or Moscow a Buddhism study section, resume the "Buddhist's Library" publication and so forth. The speech of B.S. Yerasov (Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute) contained an analysis of the current state of orientalist culturology in the Soviet Union and abroad. He described the work of the Culture Study Group

operating in the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute under the leadership of Ye.P. Chelyshev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. A.A. Kutsenkov, chief editor of the journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, supported the proposition concerning the importance and relevance of the study of the cultural traditions of oriental countries and assured those assembled that the journal opens wide its pages for the publication of works on the history and contemporary state of the culture of these countries.

The activity of the Coordinating Commission for Publication of Monuments of Oriental Literature was described at the meeting by G.F. Girs, head of the Department of Monuments of Literature of the Oriental Peoples of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute. The commission has drawn up a plan for the study of manuscripts numbering 252 subjects being fulfilled in 29 research establishments. The further development of this work is being impeded by the lag in the study of source-study procedural problems. It is necessary at the level of the "Monuments of Oriental Literature" series editorial board to analyze the experience of publication of this series and formulate recommendations for an improvement in the quality of publications.

A.B. Khalidov, head of the Arabic Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute Leningrad Department, familiarized the participants in the meeting with the state of the cataloguing of Arabic manuscripts in the USSR. The repositories in Tashkent, Baku and Leningrad are well known, but there are also significant collections in Kazan, Samarkand, Makhachkala, Dushanbe, Tbilisi and Ufa. There are also manuscript collections in Moscow, Yerevan, Khunzakh, Zakataly and Ashkhabad. The total number of manuscripts (excluding separations of the collections and not counting fragments) is 45,000. Two urgent problems are the formulation of a set of measures to preserve the manuscripts and an enhancement of the prestigious nature of work on cataloguing and publishing catalogues. The speech of M.A. Usmanov, prorector of Kazan University, in which he argued the timeliness of the creation under the auspices of Kazan University of an archaeographical laboratory, which would work in close contact with the USSR Archaeographical Commission Oriental Section, was read out.

L.R. Polonskaya (Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute), O.I. Giginayshvili (Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute) and others also participated in the discussion of the problems raised at the meeting.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

8850
CSO: 1807/385

CONFERENCES AT ORIENTAL STUDIES INSTITUTE DESCRIBED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 123-126

[Text] May 1985 was the 150th anniversary of the founding of the Kyakhta Chinese Language School, the first special educational institution in Russia in which the contemporary Chinese language was taught.

A scientific session was held in the institute's China Department in connection with this date. The paper "The Kyakhta Chinese Language School and Its Role in the Training of Sinologists" was delivered by A.N. Khokhlov (Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute). He noted that in January 1831 N.Ya. Bichurin (1777-1853), who had arrived in Kyakhta with P.L. Shilling, set up a group of children of local merchants and urban tradesmen for the purpose of teaching them Chinese. Considering the expanding trade relations with Qing China in the area of Kyakhta, the main center of Russian-Chinese trade, on 19 November 1832 the Russian Government issued a decree on the establishment of a Chinese language school at this point (on the border with Mongolia). Upon completion of the construction of the school building in Kyakhta and the purchase of books in Peking the Russian Government sent N.Ya. Bichurin and K.G. Krymskiy there in February 1835.

Thanks to their efforts (K.G. Krymskiy taught Chinese here right up until his death in October 1861), in the 25 years of its existence the Kyakhta School trained many qualified translators. Among the best products of the school were the brothers Ivan and Innokentiy Diyanov. The speaker reported his find in Irkutsk of the manuscript of a Chinese-Russian dictionary compiled by I. Diyanov in 1864.

On 23 December 1985 there was a meeting in the China Department devoted to the centenary of the death of the outstanding Russian orientalist I.I. Zakharov (1814-1885), the author of many works on the history of China and, particularly, pertaining to Manchurian studies. In the paper "I.I. Zakharov--Diplomat and Orientalist" A.N. Khokhlov adduced new archive material recounting I.I. Zakharov's diplomatic activity. Having noted the importance of his works in the field of Manchurian philology and Chinese cartography, the speaker reported his discovery in Kazan of a hitherto unknown manuscript of the scholar entitled "The Khoshoty in Khukhunor and Their Attitude Toward China," which is of considerable interest for study of

the history of international relations in Central Asia. As the archive data testify, this work was prepared by I.I. Zakharov in the period of his residence in Peking in 1840-1850 and in 1844 was evaluated highly by its first reviewer, the well-known orientalist D.S. Chestnyy.

On 20 November 1985 there was a meeting of the institute Academy Council under the chairmanship of G.F. Kim, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, devoted to study of the problems of the stability of the traditional forms of Japanese culture and the role of traditions in modern Japan. The paper "The Continuity and Transformation of Medieval Culture in Modern Japan" was delivered by V.N. Goreglyad, head of the Japan Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute Leningrad Department. He traced the main landmarks of the history of the development of Japanese traditional culture. The first borrowing of Chinese culture occurred in the 7th-8th centuries: Buddhism, agricultural crop cultivation techniques, astronomy. This was followed by a period of relative isolation. The rich Heian culture arose, which may be considered an expression of enriched national traditional culture and counteraction to the unconditional introduction of foreign influences. The second wave was the spread in Japan of Sung Confucianism (13th-14th centuries). It took two centuries (14th-15th) to assimilate it. It is logical to consider the third wave the "Christian" influence, that is, the penetration of Japan by European culture via Western missionaries and merchants. But it percolated noticeably only up to the mid-16th century, and in the period of the country's self-isolation (1637-1854), to a very limited extent. The fourth period of borrowings, which began after the 1868 revolution, is characterized by the unusually extensive influence of European culture, which poured into Japan in a mighty stream. At this time the defense of national culture proceeded both along the line of propaganda of its distinctiveness and richness and the line of extolling traditional culture, but by no means always the best aspects thereof, in particular, the Japanese Bushido code of the chivalry sphere and the so-called national science of kokugaku, which substantiated the prerogatives of power of Japan's imperial dynasty and the Japanese people's superiority to all others. Logically this served as the point of departure for the ideology of nationalism and racism. Finally, the fifth, contemporary, stage of borrowings pertains to the period since WWII, when Japan has been invaded most actively by American culture.

Traditions are very strong in present-day Japan. They are being displayed in state practice, at work, in social life and in religious beliefs. It is very important to study them, the speaker believed. The state of traditional Japanese culture and the influence of foreign borrowings is attracting the attention of Japanese and Western (particularly American) scholars. There is in Soviet science also a number of works devoted to such subjects (by T.P. Grigoryeva, N.A. Iofan and others). However, these are not enough. It is essential to unite the efforts of medievalist historians, political scientists, literary historians, Buddhism scholars and art historians. There is an urgent need for the convening of a conference on the problem of the general and the particular in Japanese culture, and it is necessary to sum up research and outline long-term plans.

I.A. Latyshev, head of the Japan Department, noted in his speech the two major revolutionary changes which had occurred in Japan's cultural life in the era of capitalism: the first in the years of the Meiji reforms, the second in the period of the postwar reforms under the conditions of American occupation of the country. As a result of these reforms the cultural life of Japanese society has begun largely to correspond to the American and European models, and there has been an essential change in the national mentality of the Japanese. Further, there was a rapid growth of Japan's economic power in the 1960's-1970's. Against the background of this growth arguments have appeared in the Japanese press concerning the "uniqueness," "inimitability" and "superiority" of Japanese culture and the fact that the Japanese are people of a "special, higher sort". Some Japanese nationalists are claiming even that it is time to speak no longer of Japanese culture but of "Japanese civilization". This conceals the purposeful policy of the ruling circles attempting to prove that the current successes of Japanese science, technology and the economy are the result not of the confluence of a number of political and economic circumstances favorable to Japan but the result of some "special" national attributes of the Japanese inherent in them since the 11th-12th centuries. Unfortunately, individual publications sometimes appear in the Soviet press which fail to critically evaluate the various versions of the Japanese nationalists.

I.A. Latyshev observed that study of the current state of Japanese culture is no less important. Study of the modern culture of Japan cannot be reduced merely to the question of the influence of the traditions of the past on the present cultural life of the country. This life needs to be studied in all its diversity by the constant joint creative efforts of Japanese experts of various profiles: philologists, historians, cultural historians and economists.

There are two approaches upon an analysis of the significance of traditional Japanese literature and culture, T.P. Grigoryeva believes. In one case the small scale of decades (contemporaneity) is taken, and it is essentially only the effect which is then visible. In the other case the entire historical process of the development of Japanese traditional culture as a whole is examined, and then the causes of its corresponding changes at different stages and these changes themselves can be seen. In a period of borrowing Japan relaxed its nationalism, in a period of assimilation, it hardened it.

V.M. Alpatov observed that currently nationalist trends are being manifested extensively in the sphere of linguistics also. The exclusive singularities of the Japanese language are being extolled. There are even books declaring that "the world should speak Japanese". I.F. Vardul called attention to the fact that not only the negative aspects should be seen in the discussion of linguistic works. He expressed the wish that the Japan Department conduct annual scientific conferences. S.I. Verbitskiy emphasized that Western economists and political scientists are not only and not so much praising Japan as studying traditions, particularly those which are playing an important part at the present time also. These are, in particular, the group consciousness of the Japanese influencing the prevention of strikes, the practice of

obligatory unanimity (consensus) when adopting important government and other decisions (conclusion of the recent Japanese-Chinese treaty, for example) and so forth. Ya.N. Guzevatyy believes that there cannot be two approaches to a determination of the significance of traditional Japanese culture. In V.I. Goreglyad's paper study of ancient monuments and the entire culture is conducted with regard for the modern world outlook, and this is correct.

L.P. Delyusin emphasized that the Asian countries of our day, China particularly, are characterized by a universal appeal to tradition and the thinkers of different eras--from Confucius to Sun Yatsen. The question of what afforded Japan an opportunity to forge ahead is of particular interest to the Chinese. Some believe that Confucianism contributed to the development of the Japanese economy. Others, on the contrary, claim that it is Confucian traditions which are holding back China's development. The theme of the traditional is topical for orientalists working in any department of the institute. L.P. Delyusin considers essential a symposium on this problem and the creation in the institute of a Philosophy of the East section. L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya observed that even the Muslim world is discussing the Japanese model. She supported the proposal concerning the convening of a broad symposium.

The discussion was summed up by G.F. Kim.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

8850

CSO: 1807/385

AFRICA INSTITUTE 'ROUNDTABLE' ON CONTINENT'S FOOD PROBLEMS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 126-128

[Text] A "roundtable" meeting was held in the institute in October 1985 devoted to the problem of the exacerbation of the food situation on the African continent. Representatives of research institutes and specialists of a number of practical organizations participated.

Opening the meeting, A.A. Gromyko, director of the institute and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, emphasized the urgency of the problems in question.

The meeting studied questions concerning the food strategy and ecological policy of African states at the current stage and also the foreign policy and political aspects of the food problem on the continent.

A paper on the food situation in African countries was presented by L.V. Goncharov (Africa Institute). He observed that a highly unpropitious situation is taking shape in the food situation on the continent at the present time. A solution of the food problem before the year 2000 does not appear possible owing to a number of economic, political and social factors causing the food problem to grow into a food crisis. A most important factor impeding the solution of the problem is the shortage of material and financial resources necessary for large-scale capital investments in the agrarian sector.

M.B. Gornung (USSR Academy of Sciences Geography Institute) examined ecological aspects of the food problem. Farming is carried out under extreme conditions in the majority of developing countries of the African continent. Marginal land constitutes more than half the area of cultivable land. The attempts to develop new areas are leading to this extent or the other to the impoverishment of the resource potential of the continent's countries, particularly to a general reduction in the capacity of the soil to retain moisture, which was a cause of the 1984-1985 drought. We should also attribute to the important factors of the deterioration of the food situation the process of desert encroachment and soil erosion, the inordinate pressure on land resources, the extremely low yield of food crops and the grim demographic situation. All these factors are preventing an increase in and

preservation at the current level even of the production of food by traditional methods and will continue to have a negative impact on the development of agriculture.

A.Ye. Sizov (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations) and A.A. Sorokin (Africa Institute) showed the prospects of the development of the food situation on the continent up to the year 2000. The trend of the lagging food production growth rate behind the population growth rate forms the basis of an evaluation of the dynamics of the food situation. Labor productivity in agriculture is extremely low. The proportion of human labor in agricultural production in African countries constitutes approximately 80 percent, and fertilizer consumption, an average of 10 kilos per hectare per year. This factor, together with the above-mentioned factors, will lead in the coming decades to a further exacerbation of the food problem in Africa.

S.V. Ivashuro (USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade Scientific Research Business Conditions Institute) observed that under conditions where the level of food self-sufficiency constitutes less than 50 percent African developing countries are forced to resort to an expansion of imports of foodstuffs from the developed countries. In the period 1970 through 1985 cereal imports grew approximately fourfold and currently amount to 28 million tons. In the opinion of specialists, the cereals shortage in the continent's developing countries will in the next 15 years increase and will by the year 2000 have reached 50-60 million tons a year. The import demand for grain in this same period will increase to 30-40 millions tons a year.

V.N. Timoshenko (Africa Institute) described the food problem in different regions of the continent. The most dangerous center of starvation will in the foreseeable future remain the Sahel zone. In drought years new bursts of starvation may be expected in East and Southern African countries. An extremely strained situation is taking shape in the 24 African countries which suffered from the 1984-1985 drought. The drought had dire consequences for the population of socialist Ethiopia.

L.V. Goncharov emphasized that comprehensive plans for the development of the food sector are being adopted and the corresponding bodies responsible for carrying out food policy are being created in a number of African countries.

An important part in the development of agriculture and the production of food in African developing states should be played by the development of agricultural credit and improvement of the system of purchase prices aimed at stimulating the agricultural producer. The development of food production on the continent is impossible without the creation of the corresponding infrastructure and also without an improvement of the supply-sales network. Special reserve food stocks are being created to provide the population with foodstuffs in the event of harvest failures.

The speeches of the participants in the "roundtable" noted that the shortage of food and hunger are increasing political instability on the continent, in

the states implementing progressive socioeconomic transformations included. To a certain extent this also applies to states which are at a relatively high (compared with other African countries) level of economic development (Algeria, Madagascar and others).

An analysis of the food situation and forecast of the development of the food sector in African countries show that in the coming decades a key factor in the solution of the food problem will be the traditional sector of agriculture, and the main subject of the long-term programs of agricultural development, the peasant himself armed with efficient implements of manual labor and provided with inexpensive equipment since it is he who has the decisive role in the process of the transition from archaic systems of farming to more intensive "intermediate" techniques. No food programs, even if they are based on highly productive capital-intensive techniques, can solve the problem of hunger at the present time if they exclude from the production process the majority of peasants.

V.K. Pospelov (CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute) emphasized that the development of the traditional sector in the African countries is acquiring special significance since for the emergent states the problem of eliminating hunger is most closely connected with the problem of the struggle for socialism.

It was observed at the meeting that particular significance for the solution of the food problem in Africa is attached to the creation of the appropriate organizational structure in the agrarian sector: peasant associations, cooperatives, trade unions and so forth.

A.A. Sorokin, A.Ye. Sizov and V.N. Timoshenko studied the question of the growing scale of Western countries' food assistance to African developing countries. The supplies of food and other forms of assistance are leading to a lessening of the economic independence of the recipients of the aid. In addition, the assistance is not always sufficiently effective since the lack of transport facilities and roads is making the timely delivery of food to the disaster areas difficult. G.S. Khozin (USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute) noted the trend toward the politicization of the West's food aid to the developing states. Using food aid as a traditional instrument of political pressure on the emergent countries, the imperialist powers are pursuing a differentiated policy when rendering assistance, that is, are making the volume of supplies dependent not on the actual needs of the population of the African countries but on the political orientation of the existing regimes. Thus in recent years the Arab Republic of Egypt has accounted for more than half the food supplies from the United States. It may be expected that in the period 1986-2000 Western countries will not be granting sufficient food aid to such countries as, for example, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and others if the policy pursued by the governments of these countries preserves its anti-imperialist focus. Endeavoring to strengthen their positions in Africa and considering the new trends in the political life of the region, Western countries have in recent years been switching from the granting of one-time emergency food assistance to the

elaboration and introduction of special large-scale long-term agricultural and ecological programs. V.S. Baskin (Africa Institute) observed that the United States' share of the West's total assistance to African countries is approximately 60 percent. The EEC and Japan are major donors. Western countries frequently use food aid to the developing states as an instrument of regulating domestic prices for foodstuffs and easing the negative consequences of food overproduction. S.I. Belenchuk (USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade Scientific Research Business Conditions Institute) and S.G. Ivanchuk (Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute) illustrated the question of food aid rendered via the World Bank. The politicization of this aid is expressed, in particular, in the fact that the World Bank renders assistance merely on certain terms, orienting the recipient-states toward a lessening of the role of the public sector in agriculture, compliance with certain financial demands and so forth.

V.G. Pavlov (USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations NIIETS), A.Ye. Sizov and A.A. Sorokin analyzed the development of Soviet-African cooperation in the sphere of agriculture and food production. The USSR's assistance in the building of agricultural facilities in Ethiopia may serve as an example of fruitful cooperation. The socialist community countries occupy a leading place in the volume of food supplies to the starving population of Ethiopia per capita.

The debate which developed in the course of the meeting confirmed once again the seriousness and urgency of the food problem on the African continent. It made it possible to illustrate a broad range of issues concerning the development of agriculture and food production in African countries and also to formulate a number of practical recommendations for a strengthening of Soviet-African cooperation in this sphere.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

8850
CSO: 1807/385

BOOK ON DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB OIL MONARCHIES REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 170-174

[A.L. Kondakov review of book on Arabian oil monarchies]

[Text] The book in question* represents the first summary, essentially interdisciplinary, study in Soviet scientific literature on problems of the development of the oil monarchies of Arabia--a subregion of the Arab world which just a few decades ago was considered the most backward. The authors set themselves the task of "comprehending the unique experience of the socio-political and economic development of societies under conditions cardinally different from the 'classic' model of development of the emergent countries" (p 3), concentrating their attention on central problems of the capitalist transformation of the Arabian monarchies.

The states studied in the work--Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia--occupy a special place in the group of oil-exporting developing countries. They are characterized on the one hand by the prerequisites of rapid economic growth conditioned by huge revenues from accelerated liquid fuel exports common to this entire group and, on the other, by specific inhibitors of such growth in the form primarily of smallness of population, which is atypical of the Asian continent, the paucity of natural resources other than oil and gas and the extreme archaic nature of the initial social structures. Truly, the Arabian oil monarchies demonstrated in the 1970's-1980's a very high level of a number of most important economic indicators. Thus the average per capita gross domestic product for the five countries amounted in 1981 to \$21,451, the economic growth rate constituted 30 percent annually (in current prices) in 1971-1981, the real accumulation norm in 1981 was 19.8 percent and the sum total of overseas assets amounted to \$268 billion (plus more than \$19 billion annual profit on these investments). As a result the correlation of conditions of economic growth--shortage of financial resources and "surpluses" of labor resources--has been inverted here. Inasmuch as the financial aspect of the problem of accumulation for these countries has in fact been solved, at least for the

* A.G. Georgiyev, V.V. Ozoling, "Neftyanyye monarkhii Aravii. Problemy razvitiya" [The Arabian Oil Monarchies. Problems of Development], Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatelstva "Nauka". 1983, pp 224.

forseeable future, the contradiction between capital investment requirements and the possibilities of domestic accumulation typical of the developing world has been transformed into a contradiction between sharply increased investment potential and a very narrow national base of its effective use. All this is leaving its imprint on the ways, forms and methods of realization of capitalist transformation in the Arabian monarchies and conditioning its specific singularities.

The concentration of huge financial resources in the hands of the state combined with the underdevelopment of private enterprise, which was incapable of taking sufficiently substantial part in the creation of the foundations of a modern economy, predetermined the accelerated development of the state-capitalist sector of the economy, which currently has become the leading force of capitalist transformations in these countries. Large-scale national economic development programs were oriented toward the state-capitalist structure. As the book observes, "the governments of all the countries in question adhere to the official doctrine of the development in every way possible of private-economic capitalism. The state-capitalist sector is everywhere declared an instrument designed to prepare the necessary economic conditions for the functioning of the private sector" (p 113). At the same time we have to agree with the authors' opinion that the forecast according to which the bureaucratic bourgeoisie will, as the private sector strengthens, merge with the private-capitalist class, and the bulk of the enterprises of the public sector will be handed over to private capital would seem unduly rectilinear, failing to take into account the specifics of the Arabian monarchies. First, the very possibilities of the rapid development of the private sector appear highly problematical: the long timeframes of the capital turnover rate in the modern sectors of industry, the largely unclear profitability prospects, the commercial-usurious nature of the capital of the majority of private entrepreneurs and the absence among them of any serious experience of activity in industry. Second, the ruling elite cannot fail to understand that, as its economic positions strengthen, the national bourgeoisie will inevitably insist on a redistribution of political and economic power in its favor. For this reason the traditional upper stratum of the Arabian monarchies, while paying lipservice to the utmost encouragement of private-capitalist enterprise, is in practice endeavoring to keep it within a strict framework and rendering it strictly measured assistance, unwilling to permit an increase in the economic authority of the private sector in the national economy above a certain level.

Consequently, it is possible to speak of the proximity or certain concurrence at the present stage of development of the interests of the Arabian ruling elite, the haute bourgeoisie and the new middle strata, which were summoned into being and which strengthened their positions considerably in the course of the "oil prosperity," but by no means of their merger or the complete identity of their interests.

The authors show convincingly how under the specific conditions of the capitalist transformation of the Arabian monarchies the dynamics of economic modernization are contributing to the gradual transfer of backward economic

structures to a capitalist basis and their incorporation in the reproduction mechanism of the modern sector. Thus the rapid process of urban growth in a number of the principalities is actually already reaching its limit. Together with the transfer of a considerable proportion of agricultural production to the tracks of capitalist enterprise and the creation of large-scale capitalist farms extensive nomadic stockbreeding is on the decline and the historically inherited forms of small-scale commodity farming are stagnating. Traditional processes now have a negligible place in the national economy and are exerting practically no influence on its dynamics. The share of all traditional structures in the gross domestic product constitutes 0.9 percent in Saudi Arabia (1977), 0.5 percent on Bahrain (1975), 0.2 percent in Kuwait (1980/81) and less than 0.1 percent in Abu Dhabi, Qatar and the other emirates, apart from Ras al-Khaymah (p 157).

As already mentioned, as distinct from the majority of other developing countries, a most difficult problem on the path of economic development of the states in question is the acute shortage of national labor resources. The main reasons for this are the smallness of their population and the low level of women's participation in social production. The enlistment of local inhabitants in the productive sectors of the economy is also complicated by the ineffectiveness of both the material and moral incentives to physical labor. The mentality of former nomads conflicts with the regular and regulated nature of industrial labor. Work at industrial enterprises appears to them shameful and unworthy of a true nomad. The authors of the book in question write that the indigenous inhabitants of the Arabian monarchies prefer "noble" professions, primarily work in the civil service and the army, activity in the commercial sphere and so forth (p 60). All the above-mentioned factors led to the need for the extensive enlistment of immigrant workers, who currently are numerically predominant, considerably, what is more, in the working class of the Arabian oil-producing countries. Essentially the main efforts pertaining to the creation of the foundation of a modern economy have been entrusted to foreign workers and specialists.

The rulers of the Arabian monarchies are endeavoring in every way possible to minimize and neutralize the cultural, religious, ideological and political influence of the immigrants on the indigenous population. For this purpose they create and maintain between these two communities social, property and legal inequality, limit foreign workers' contacts with the local inhabitants (measures to isolate and strictly control the immigrants, the construction of industrial enterprises far from major inhabited localities), practice the recruitment on contract of workers from foreign countries for increasingly short terms and so forth.

In order to solve the problem of the shortage of labor resources the Arabian states are making efforts to augment the increase in the local population, enlist it in the productive sphere, develop a modern system of education and vocational-technical training and so forth. These measures, however, are not as yet capable of improving in any way seriously the situation on the national manpower markets. We can agree with the authors, who believe that at least in the next 10-15 years there will be no appreciable change in the

situation in the sphere of labor resources in the Arabian monarchies and that their dependence on foreign manpower will remain a long-term factor of economic development (p 64).

In the comparatively short period of active transformation along the capitalist path general contours of their development models have been determined in the Arabian oil monarchies. As the authors emphasize, under the pressure of objective circumstances the ruling elite of these countries have opted for the authoritarian conservative-modernizing path of capitalist development, a path of reforms under strict control from above. The development of capitalist forms of the economy and experiments with the introduction of certain bourgeois elements in the traditional political and ideological institutions are being made dependent on the capacity of these innovations to contribute to the preservation of real power in the hands of the monarchical families. However, independently of the desire of the elite, a process of bourgeoisification of the superstructure, slow and in highly contradictory forms, is occurring on this path. In the opinion of the authors, "as a whole the feudal aristocracy has already become a privileged part of the haute local bourgeoisie endowed with political power" (p 55). It would evidently be more accurate to say that a relatively substantial stratum in the ruling families of the Arabian monarchies has acquired features characteristic of the haute bourgeoisie, having essentially become its analogue.

As the book observes, the Arabian oil-exporting states are developing, despite the as a whole similar development strategy, in accordance with their own approach to the tactics of achieving the set goals (p 48), which has been conditioned by the difference in the time of the start and the timeframes of the passage of individual stages of capitalist transformation, the diversity of sociopolitical and economic conditions and so forth. From this viewpoint all these countries can be divided into two groups. To the first, the authors believe, pertain Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, in which paramount significance is paid to the development of a relatively diversified economy and efforts are being made to create modern sectors of manufacturing industry, including those unconnected with oil. The task of capitalization of the oil income within the framework of the world capitalist economy has practically never confronted them or, in view of the appreciable reduction in the proceeds from oil in recent years, has receded into the background. It would seem that, according to the authors' classification, it would have been more accurate to also have included Qatar in the first group. The " cursory analysis" (p 48) of this country's budget policy made in the book is hardly sufficient for placing it in the second group. The stated goals of Qatar's economic strategy coincide practically fully with the tasks of the economic policy of the Arabian monarchies placed in the first group. Back in 1972 a 10-year plan of development for 1973-1982 was drawn up in Qatar aimed at preparation of the emirate for the "post-oil" period. In terms of the indicator of the average 1971-1981 capital investments norm Qatar was second among the Arabian oil monarchies only to the UAE, and in terms of the annual average rate of increase in the production sphere in this same period it directly approached Saudi Arabia and the UAE, having overtaken Bahrain and having left Kuwait far behind. The present sum of Qatar's overseas assets,

some of which, owing to financial complications, has been repatriated, hardly permits this country to set the task of conversion into a rentier state. I believe that the considerations expressed above are grounds for putting Qatar / in the first group.

As distinct from the said countries, Kuwait, implementing a "selective" approach to the development of the national economy, has chosen in favor of the preferential capitalization of the oil revenue abroad. This country is paying the main attention to the coordinated development of the oil sector of the economy, the creation of conditions for the transition from the export of crude to the preferential export of its refined products and the incorporation of the country's oil economy in the system of the international capitalist division of labor on more equal terms. The policy of the export of capital abroad is also subordinated to these goals to a certain extent. The authors show that Kuwait occupies a position in respect of the private sector which is different from the other Arabian oil monarchies (pp 131-132). Whereas Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, while recognizing for the private sector certain prospects in economic development, are nonetheless tackling the main tasks of industrialization along public sector lines, the Kuwait Government believes that private businessmen should play the leading part or, at least, a part equal with the public sector in the creation of the modern sectors of the economy.

The question which the book raises of the development of interstate economic relations in the Persian Gulf region is of considerable interest. The authors write that the intensification of economic cooperation between countries of the region was brought about by the very course of their socioeconomic development in the period following the 1973-1974 "oil boom," which made possible the adoption in them of large-scale, but largely uniform economic programs. The creation of parallel economies repeating one another inevitably entailed the irrational use of natural resources, unwarranted competition within the framework of the region's industrial structure, a lowering of profitability indicators and so forth. The endeavor to overcome the narrowness of the home markets and the difficulties in marketing certain types of product of the export-oriented industrial sectors (petroleum products, petrochemical raw material, fertilizer, aluminum and others) also contributed to the development of the integration process. A most important result of the expanded and intensified economic relations between the Arabian oil monarchies was the creation by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Oman on 5 February 1981 of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The council's activity testifies that the countries of the Arabian peninsula are in their endeavor to strengthen mutual economic relations following the theory and practice of capitalist integration, but with certain modifications. The very first measures in this sphere revealed such important singularities of integration development distinguishing it from analogous processes in West Europe as the start of integration measures from a higher level, a break with the sequence of realization of individual stages of the integration process customary for developed capitalist countries, their "compression" in time or "superpositioning" on one another and so forth.

The final chapter of the monograph, which is devoted to internal contradictions of the Arabian societies' social development, shows how the policy adopted by these countries of the accelerated development of the economic basis, the creation of a system of modern productive forces, the coming into being of a formationally uniform diversified capitalist sector and the "cultivation" of various forms of private capitalist enterprise are objectively leading to a gradual weakening of the even recently permanent traditional principles and foundations of the monarchies' social and political stability. The ruling regimes and dynasties of Arabia "are faced with the problem of survival in a rapidly changing world" (p 168). It should be added that the trend which has been observed in recent years toward a decline in prices on the world oil market has made the Arabian states' conditions of economic growth worse, which could require a revision of certain aspects of the present economic policy and, in any event, is introducing an appreciable element of uncertainty into the future prospects of these countries' development. It is also unclear whether the ruling upper stratum will retain control of sociopolitical development, having isolated it from economic growth. The contradictions between the basis, which is rapidly being transformed into a capitalist basis, and the as a whole as yet feudal-monarchical superstructure, the disproportion between the economic authority of the new classes and strata which arose at the time of the "oil prosperity" and the inadequacy of their role in the system of political power, the unequal position of the immigrant workers, who are numerically superior to the local population, the intrusion of foreign values, morals, ideas and ways of life bringing about an acute crisis of society's self-awareness--this is a far from complete list of the factors capable of exerting a destabilizing influence on these countries' internal situation and making appreciable adjustments to the process of their economic and political development. Thus, as the authors of the book in question rightly believe, "the countries of the Arabian region, granted all their undoubted specifics, are by no means 'spared' the effect of the general regularities of the world revolutionary process" (p 181).

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"

Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

8850

CSO: 1807/385

BOOK ON BEGINNING OF SOCIALIST THOUGHT IN CHINA REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 174-176

[N.A. Simoniya review of book on early Chinese socialism]

[Text] A most important objective consequence of colonialism's entry into its final phase was the formation in the colonies and semicolonial territories of elements of a national capitalist structure, strata of a nationalist intelligentsia and of the ideology of nationalism itself. At the same time the specifics of the formation of capitalism in the colonial and dependent countries were, in particular, that it occurred in an era when the world capitalist formation had embarked on its late phase and when class-heterogeneous teachings and currents of socialism had begun to perform an increasingly important role in the social-political life of the developed capitalist countries. As a result the ideological situation in the colonial-semicolonial countries characterized by the confrontation of traditionalism and the nationalism which was becoming firmly established was complicated by the impact of a variety of Western socialist ideas. The mere fact of such influence is generally recognized and has been illustrated quite fully in scientific literature. A specific analysis of the very process of the influence and its end results may be encountered considerably less frequently, however. In this respect the monograph in question* has undoubtedly taken a big step forward on the basis of material of such a major semicolonial country as China. An appreciable gap in the study of the formation in this country of modern social thought has been made good.

The work's chronological framework is short--1901-1907--but it is a question of no ordinary period in China's history. These were the years when diverse theories of non-Marxist socialism were being reflected in China's current affairs writing for the first time. In other words, it is a question of the moment of the inception of socialist thought in China, the moment when the question of a socialist prospect had become a factor of ideological-political struggle among opposition forces. The author investigates most carefully not

* L.N. Borokh, "Obshchestvennaya mysl Kitaya i sotsializm (nachalo XX v.)" [Social Thought of China and Socialism (Start of 20th Century)], Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury Izdatelstva "Nauka", 1984, pp 296.

only how the outstanding leaders of the opposition movement--Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Sun Yatsen--familiarized themselves with the ideas of socialism but also, far more importantly, how these ideas were interpreted in their consciousness. It is this, I believe, which is the particular relevance and theoretical significance of the book.

The point being that there has been a tendency in the recent past in Soviet historical science to regard the impact of socialist ideas on oriental countries too rectilinearly and unequivocally: there are ideas and there is the object of their impact. It has been allowed here that the perception of these ideas by those whom they influenced does not always proceed sufficiently fully and well, but it has always been implied that the ideas themselves have been reproduced by and large in their original form. Yet L.N. Borokh has shown convincingly and graphically that it should be a question not of the more or less adequate reproduction of Western ideas but rather of their transformation upon contact with local soil and of their synthesis either with incipient nationalism or with elements of traditional ideologies or with both simultaneously (pp 28, 106, 165-166 and elsewhere). Another valuable quality of the work is the fact that the author does not lecture China's political figures of that time after the fact and does not upbraid them for their lack of understanding or lack of consideration of the corresponding aspects of scientific (or other) socialism. L.N. Borokh shows convincingly that these people clearly understood that to which they aspired and took from Western theories that which they sought. The author convinces us that it could not have been otherwise for we are dealing here not with schoolchildren or idle dreamers but with political figures of a specific era and a specific country seeking an answer to the most acute problems primarily of their own country. And this circumstance had inevitably to make its mark on what these figures perceived and borrowed from Western ideas and values and how.

Behind all this is the tremendous amount of work which the author has done on enlisting new sources and literature and the recomprehension, interpretation and reinterpretation based on Marxist-Leninist methodology and with regard for the new level of Soviet oriental studies of some of the old publications and settled opinions and propositions. As examples, we may point, in particular, to the new approach to the question of Sun Yatsen's development of his land program (p 106) or the reinterpretation of the evaluation made by M. Bernal of the level of erudition of Liang Qichao concerning the socialist teachings of the West (pp 106-107) and others.

The problem of the spread of Marxism in any country presupposes primarily an examination of the preparatory stage: the quest for the sources of the communist movement, an analysis of its prerequisites and also an evaluation of the concepts which had to be overcome in the course of the ideological struggle. We have to agree with the author that "without having studied the forms of utopian socialism which had arisen at that time it is impossible on the basis of Chinese material to pose and solve the problem of the transition from utopia to science..." (p 5). Let's face it, in our country the history of the communist movement in the East begins more often than not directly

with the Comintern, and all that went before this remains not a gap even but a blackout. Yet many of the mistakes of the communist movement in that period and many of its singularities in our day cannot be explained sufficiently fully (and therefore correctly) without a knowledge of the subsoil in which this movement arises. This is not only the scientific-theoretical but also practical significance of L.N. Borokh's book.

Another important aspect of its significance is the fact that to this day the problem of the adaptation and transformation of socialist ideas in the minds of the revolutionary democracy of Asian and African countries is exceptionally acute. It is difficult detaching oneself from the impression when reading the pages devoted to the arguments by Chinese politicians of the start of the 20th century concerning the specific features of the class structure of Chinese society, its insufficient differentiation, the "absence" of class contradictions, the possibility of immediate transition to socialism, the "advantages" in this respect of backwardness, the certain features of socialism allegedly immanently inherent in the traditional society in ancient times and so forth that it is a question of the present-day reality of many Asian and African countries.

The author's conclusion that "the first interpreters of the principle of the people's prosperity facilitated familiarization with the new current of Western thought, revealing its content in the customary form for the Chinese reader. But this adaptation distorted the meaning of Western socialism" (p 191) sounds convincing. It is well shown in the book how Western socialism is converted into Chinese socialism, within whose framework "socialism" is subordinated to state nationalism (pp 182, 188-189, 224-229). The general conclusion that "the particular historical conditions necessary for the transition from utopia to science had at the start of the 20th century not taken shape in China" (p 233) is legitimate.

Many pages of L.N. Borokh's monograph graphically demonstrate how useful a methodological approach based on the concept of synthesis may be. The author notes, for example, the presence in Soviet sinology of two polar evaluations of Kang Youwei: for some he is a representative of the Chinese bourgeoisie and liberal landowners, for others, a spokesman for the interests of the landowners and the shenshih (p 249). Meanwhile his personality reflects a synthesis of two principles, which is so characteristic of historical situations on the boundary of eras. L.N. Borokh reveals the dialectic of this phenomenon: subjectively Kang Youwei was not, of course, a bourgeois, he even sharply criticized capitalism, but objectively, in terms of their practical orientation, his reforms were undoubtedly bourgeois (see p 105).

I would like in connection with the subject matter which has been touched upon to make the following observation. Describing on page 201 the confrontation of Liang Qichao and Sun Yatsen and his supporters, L.N. Borokh sums up: "In essence it was an argument about what would save China: capitalism or socialism." That is the point, not "in essence" but in form. In essence, that is, actually, two different versions of the capitalist development of China were in confrontation objectively, but one of them was embellished in socialist tones (after all, it is a question of the Sun Yatsen of the start

of the 20th century). Subjective points--"criticism of capitalism," an "endeavor" to bypass it--are used not entirely accurately in this connection as arguments for the conclusion concerning "a development strategy going beyond the bourgeois framework," that is, concerning a variety of socialism (p 203). After all, the main thing in Lenin's interpretation of the quotation from F. Engels mentioned by L.N. Borokh (ibid.) is as follows: "Erroneous in the formal-economic sense, populist democratism is truth in the historical sense; erroneous as a socialist utopia, this democratism is the truth of the distinctive historically conditioned democratic struggle of the peasant masses which constitutes an inseparable component of bourgeois transformation and a condition of its complete victory."*

One further, personal observation. I believe that the juxtaposition on page 71 of Sun Yatsen and Liang Qichao along Huxley--Spenser lines is not entirely clear either. After all, neither was Liang Qichao against "interference" in the historical process and was for revolution, but "from above," per the Meiji type in Japan (see p 63). In other words, both supported a leap forward, but of a different scale and by fundamentally different methods.

Despite these observations, the overall evaluation of L.N. Borokh's monograph can only be positive: we have before us a work executed to a very high scientific standard.

* V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," Vol 22, p 120.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

8850
CS0: 1807/385

BOOK CRITICIZES THEORY OF 'THIRD PATH OF DEVELOPMENT'

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 85 (signed to press 27 May 86) pp 194-196

[U.N. Gavrilov review of book on "third way" in development]

[Text] The problems raised in the work in question* are most closely connected with questions of choice of path in the developing countries. At the center of the authors' attention are various bourgeois and petty bourgeois so-called "third way" concepts and their genesis and typology and ascertainment of their class role. The authors concentrate attention on the fact that the present situation in Afro-Asian states with their inherent irregularities of social evolution is also characterized by the variance of capitalist modernization. This singularity is reflected in ideological, including official, doctrines, in which the role of problems connected with the correlation of the national and the social, the traditional and the modern is growing.

In the first part of the book--"Historical Trends of the Modern Directions of the Development of the Social Thought of the East"--the authors investigate problems connected with the formation and development of the basic currents of the ideology of the national liberation movement, ascertain the role of traditions in the ideological and political life of the emergent states and determine the causes of the prevalence of different varieties of concepts of the "third path" of development, including its petty bourgeois versions. The second part--"National Leaders and Ideologies"--analyzes the approach to the problem of the "third way" of five different figures--Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahomed Iqbal, Mujibur Rahman, Ferdinand Marcos and Muammar Qadhafi.

* L.R. Polonskaya, A.Kh. Vafa, "Vostok: idei i ideologi. Kritika burzhuznykh i melkoburzhaznykh koontseptsiiy 'tretyego puti' razvitiya" [The East: Ideas and Ideologies. Critique of Bourgeois and Petty Bourgeois Concepts of a "Third Path" of Development], Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatelstva "Nauka", 1982, pp 256.

The nature of the basic currents of the ideology of anticolonialist struggle at the stage of its formation, the book says, was determined by the interaction of the national and the social. The working masses' recognition of their social and class interests occurred extremely slowly here (p 22). The aspiration under conditions of foreign domination to protect their national life and spiritual world from outside influences grew. All this made for the stability of feudal forms of social consciousness and the consolidation of the directions of social thought which proclaimed the need for a synthesis of traditional ideas and the needs of society's modernization. The book justifiably notes that repeated attempts to disregard the traditional and statements from purely modernizing standpoints did not gain mass support, did not become broad social movements and remained the lot of narrow Westernized groups.

The book calls attention to the fact that from the very outset the ideology of the liberation anticolonial movement united several currents. Hostility toward colonial domination and imperialism on the part of various--practically all--classes of the colonial society (with the exception of the narrow feudal and comprador upper stratum) was manifested within it at different stages and to a varying extent. "At each specific stage here the aspiration of the oppressed peoples to create their own, independent statehood was interpreted in the interests of certain classes" (p 19).

At the early stage of development national liberation ideology was expressed by a system of ideas which were religious in form and liberating in content. However, even at this stage the anticolonial ideas were subdivided in terms of social orientation into those which expressed the interests of the feudal upper stratum and the interests of the peasantry. "The currents of this type," the authors write, "reflected both the antagonistic nature of the contradictions between the feudal lords and the peasants and the limited recognition of these contradictions which was characteristic of the communal peasantry of the feudal East and connected with the particular features of its position and mentality" (p 19). Bourgeois ideology of the anticolonial struggle, however, was originally subdivided into religious-reforming and bourgeois-educational currents.

Figures of the religious-reforming currents proclaimed a "new" interpretation of religious dogmas for the purpose of criticism of feudal practices and use of the mass religious consciousness in the anticolonial struggle. The authors subdivide the currents of this type into two schools: religious-revivalist and Western. The latter, furthermore, reflected the "process of the transition from feudal to bourgeois-educational ideas" (p 20).

Actually, bourgeois nationalist ideology took shape in the East in the era of imperialism and Asia's awakening. The authors distinguish therein primarily the liberal direction, secular in form more often than not. Liberals see the national consciousness, the sole expression of which, they believed, could only be nationalism, as the main force of social progress. The authors see as the weakness of the liberal-nationalist ideology the pro-West orientation, "and it is largely owing to this that the gap between bourgeois thought and

the mass consciousness has not been eliminated" (p 25). The book distinguishes particularly liberal currents which appeared in the form of "religious nationalisms." It was here that semifeudal ideas and notions limited to the greatest extent the democratic, anti-imperialist nature of this ideology. But the "religious nationalisms" acquired, as a rule, a sharply expressed nationalist coloration. Their general bourgeois focus is not in doubt, the authors emphasize, "which gives us grounds for ascribing the 'religious nationalisms' also to ideologies of the liberal type" (p 25).

The revolutionary-democratic direction of social-political thought arises simultaneously, the authors observe. In terms of form currents of this kind were both secular and religious, and nationalist and democratic ideals constituted the ideological basis of their content. They combined bourgeois democratism with strong elements of populism, and the same contradictions and weaknesses as Russian populism in the past were characteristic of them. "These contradictions and weaknesses," the authors write, "were reflected in the subsequent development of oriental countries also, determining many singularities of their non-Marxist ideological currents in most recent times" (p 27).

Investigating the typology of ideological currents under the conditions of the state independence of Asian and African countries, the authors note primarily the swing to the right of bourgeois nationalism, whose sphere of influence has narrowed, "although is still quite great." They see as the main reason for this the change in the positions and role of the bourgeoisie under conditions where independence has been gained. The basis of the majority of the ideological-political concepts of the bourgeoisie are attempts with the aid of a "synthesis" of capitalism and socialism to formulate a "third path" of development distinct from the two world systems. It should not be forgotten that in respect of the feudal practices which continue in a number of countries the bourgeois transformations are still performing progressive functions and that the contradictions between the bourgeois development of the oriental countries and imperialism have not been removed. At the same time, however, the antisocialist and conservative, anticommunist trends of bourgeois ideology are being manifested increasingly.

The authors assert that non-Marxist social thought in a number of countries of the East is characterized by the superseding of bourgeois ideological currents by petty bourgeois currents. The latter incorporate a wide spectrum of types--from rightwing through revolutionary-democratic--which are to a large extent already going beyond the framework of the petty bourgeois character.

The book rightly poses the question of the need to see the difference between the crisis of the content of bourgeois-nationalist ideology and the crisis of its influence. "Speaking of the crisis of its influence is now premature. By crisis of the 'third way' ideology in our day should be understood not so much the loss of impact on people's minds as the change in its sociopolitical focus, its saturation with strictly bourgeois content and the revision of the principles which took shape in the period of the struggle for political independence. The crisis of this ideology is also manifested in the fact

that it is now disintegrating into various currents opposed to one another. A whole spectrum of such doctrines--radical-petty bourgeois, bourgeois-liberal, bourgeois-conservative--has arisen" (p 57).

The authors note the presence in each of the main directions of bourgeois-nationalist ideologies of a "third way" of a multitude of versions differing considerably from one another. L.R. Polonskaya and A.Kh. Vafa believe that they practically all contain two possibilities, two contradictory trends. "One is the bourgeois-conservative trend opening the way to the victory of reactionary, pro-monopoly groups of the bourgeoisie; the other is the left-radical, petty bourgeois trend, out of which a revolutionary-democratic line may crystallize" (p 98).

The modern concepts of the "third path" of development were formed under conditions of the conversion of socialism into an influential present-day force and reflect the need recognized by the ideologists of the various schools for a combination of the traditional and modern ways of life and their search for ways of eliminating colonial backwardness. The diversity of the actual conditions which exist in the emergent countries is leading to the "third way" concept being suffused with new content in each of them. This is shown in particular relief in the second part of the book, which specifically investigates the views of outstanding ideologists of the "third way". However, it would seem that the picture which is given here is incomplete since representatives of a revolutionary-democratic focus have remained outside of the authors' analysis.

One further consideration. It is well known that a truly scientific evaluation of this personality or the other consists not of a statement of what he did from the viewpoint of the present day but of the ascertainment of that which was new which he did compared with his predecessors and contemporaries. It has to be acknowledged that the authors are not always successful in such an analysis. In addition, each outline is constructed according to its own plan, which complicates the possibility of comparing the views of different ideologists. It would seem that an analysis of the views of Jawaharlal Nehru on problems of the "third way" remains incomplete without an investigation of his idea of nonalignment, which is widespread in the developing world.

Evaluating the book as a whole, it has to be said that its authors have accomplished an investigation as a result of which they have revealed the historical evolution of "third path" concepts, provided a typology thereof and determined their place among other ideas. L.R. Polonskaya and A.Kh. Vafa have shown that the concepts they have analyzed cannot even today be evaluated unequivocally and that their real content and the practical policy pursued on the basis thereof continue to express the interests of social strata of different social orientations.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985

8850
CSO: 1807/385